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Statement of Appellate Jurisdiction 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(2)(j) provides that "The Court of 
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over . . . cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court." By 
Orders of February 20 and March 7, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred 
these matters to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. By Order of April 4, 
2008, this Court granted and consolidated Appellant's two petitions for permission 
to appeal the trial court's two interlocutory orders of partial summary judgment 
against his Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) and Locomotive Inspection 
Act (LIA) injury claims based on a defective locomotive dynamic brake and a low 
locomotive cab ceiling height. 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review 
First Issue: Dynamic Brake Defect Claim 
Does the FELA's causation standard, that a railroad is liable if an 
employee's injury results "in whole or in part" from the railroad's negligence or 
violation of a statutory safety standard, require that a jury determine whether the 
brake defect in Utah Railway Co.'s lead locomotive caused Mr, Raab to become 
injured in another locomotive while replacing the lead locomotive? 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the trial court's determination and application of the 
legal causation standard on summary judgment for legal correctness. The appellate 
court does not defer to the trial court's conclusion that facts are undisputed, or to its 
legal conclusions supported by those facts. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 
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909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), 
appeal after remand, 2001 UT 107,37P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001). 
In FELA cases, where a jury determination is part and parcel of the remedy 
the FELA affords to injured railroad workers, summary judgment is more strictly 
limited than in ordinary civil cases. It is to be denied if a fair-minded juror could 
honestly decide that the railroad's fault played uany part" in the employee's injury. 
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266, 
1269, 1270 (2006); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 510, 77 S.Ct. 
443(1957). 
Congress desired to "secure jury determinations in a larger proportion of 
cases than would be true of ordinary common law actions." Boeing Co. v. 
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1969). "It follows that a trial judge must 
submit an FELA case to the jury when there is even slight evidence of negligence." 
Harbin v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 130 (7th Cir. 1990), 
citing a number of FELA decisions reversing summary judgments on evidence 
".. .scarcely more substantial than pigeon bone broth." Id. at 132. 
Issue Raised in Trial Court 
Utah Railway raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment on Mr. 
Raab's defective brake claim (R. at 334-338; 339-425). Mr. Raab and Utah 
Railway briefed and argued the issue (R. at 339-425; 452-496; 557-576; 932:1-8; 
932:15-30; 932:54-59 and the trial court entered an order granting Utah Railway's 
motion for partial summary judgment. (R. at 932:60-61). Mr. Raab specifically 
presented to the trial court at oral argument the holdings and controlling effect of 
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Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct 443 (1957), Wilson v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co, 56 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), and Christiansen v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 (2006), discussed 
below. (R. at 932:16-24). 
Second and Third Issues: Low Locomotive Cab Ceiling Height Claim 
Did the trial court incorrectly hold a piece of air-conditioning equipment, 
regardless of its dangerous placement, must malfunction in order to constitute an 
actionable defect under the Locomotive Inspection Act? 
Did the trial court impermissibly engage in fact finding and violate Mr. 
Raab's right to a jury determination under the FELA on whether the low ceiling 
was a cause, in whole or in part, of his injury? 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the trial court's determination and application of the 
legal standard of what constitutes evidence of causation, and of legal violation, on 
summary judgment for legal correctness. The appellate court does not defer to the 
trial court's conclusion that facts are undisputed, or to its legal conclusions 
supported by those facts. See Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1289 (Utah App. 1996), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), appeal after 
remand, 2001 UT 107, 37 P.3d 1130 (Utah 2001), Review affords no deference to 
the trial court's determination or conclusions of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve, 
Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). This Court views 
the facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion and will allow summary judgment to stand only if 
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the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. 
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Utah App. 1994). 
In FELA cases, where a jury determination is part and parcel of the remedy 
the FELA affords to injured railroad workers, summary judgment is more strictly 
limited than in ordinary civil cases. It is to be denied if a fair-minded juror could 
honestly decide that the railroad's fault played "any part" in the employee's injury. 
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266, 
1269, 1270 (2006); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 510, 77 S.Ct. 
443 (1957). 
Issues Raised in Trial Court 
Utah Railway raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment on Mr. 
Raab's defective low ceiling claim, (R. at 651-653); Mr. Raab and Utah Railway 
briefed and argued the issue, ((R. at 654-748; 795-854; 863-898; 932:8-15; 93230-
54); and the trial court entered an order granting Utah Railway's motion for partial 
summary judgment. (R. at 905-908). Mr. Raab specifically presented to the trial 
court at oral argument the holdings and controlling effect of Lilly v. Grand Trunk 
Western R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 63 S. Ct. 347 (1943) and other cases on the legal 
standards constituting an LIA violation, (R. at 932:32-38), Mr. Raab specifically 
presented to the trial court at oral argument the holdings and controlling effect of 
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443 (1957), Wilson v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 56 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), and Christiansen v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 (2006) on the issue of 
causation. (R. at 932:16-24). 
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The trial court, on its own and not at the request of either party, also held as 
a matter of law that Mr. Raab's was responsible for contributory negligence. Mr. 
Raab argued extensively in the previous summary judgment motion that the FELA 
requires causation issues to be detemiined by a jury. He did not specifically argue 
his low ceiling height claim was not barred or affected as a matter of law by his 
own contributory negligence because the court raised the issue on its own after 
taking the matter under advisement. 
Determinative Statutes 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51: 
Liability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate or 
foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negligence; 
employee defined 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce 
between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the 
States and Territories . . . shall be liable in damages to any person 
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such 
commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part 
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of 
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its 
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, 
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment. 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such 
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; 
or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such 
commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be 
considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and 
shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter. 
Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53: 
Contributory negligence; diminution of damages 
In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any 
such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the 
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provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to 
an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the 
fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory 
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be 
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who 
may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such 
common earner of any statute enacted for the safety of employees 
contributed to the injury or death of such employee. 
Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701: 
Requirements for use 
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or 
tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its 
parts and appurtenances -
(a) are in proper condition and safe to operate without 
unnecessary danger of personal injury; 
(b) have been inspected as required under this chapter and 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this 
chapter; and 
(c) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary 
under this chapter. 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an action for personal injuries brought by a railroad employee against 
his railroad employer pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 
51 (FELA) and an associated safety statute, the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 20701 (LIA). Plaintiff Raab claims the railroad is responsible for his 
injuries resulting from the presence of a defective dynamic brake in one 
locomotive, and an abnormally low cab ceiling, created by the installation of an 
overhead air conditioner, in another. 
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Mr. Raab sued the railroad on theories of strict liability under the LIA, and 
negligence under the FELA. The railroad denied Mr. Raab's claims and alleged 
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
The railroad filed motions for partial summary judgment, addressed at all of 
Mr. Raab's claims except for negligence concerning the locomotive ceiling height. 
The first motion sought judgment on all of Mr. Raab's claims arising from the 
defective dynamic brake, on the premise that the brake could not, under the FELA 
causation standard, be a legal cause in whole or in part of plaintiff s injuries. The 
second motion sought judgment on Mr. Raab's claims for strict liability under the 
LIA with respect to the low ceiling. The railroad contended that the position of the 
air conditioning unit which constituted the low ceiling in the locomotive cab was 
not an actionable defect under the LIA as a matter of law. 
3. Disposition in the Trial Court 
The trial court granted both of Utah Railway's motions. In addition, 
although Utah Railway did not seek it in its motion, the trial court ruled in its 
Minute Order of February 11, 2008, that "this is a case of non-attention incident to 
operation and therefore appropriate for summary judgment denying liability under 
FLIA . . . ." The trial court thus held, as a matter of law, that Mr. Raab was 
contributorily negligent for hitting his head on the low locomotive ceiling to an 
extent that barred his recovery. 
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4. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Utah Railway Co. is a coiporation authorized to transact business within the 
state of Utah and is engaged in the business of an interstate common carrier by 
railroad. Mr. Raab works for Utah Railway as a conductor. At all material times 
both parties were engaged in interstate commerce or activity substantially or 
materially affecting interstate commerce, (R. at 1 -4, % 2; 8-12, ^ 2; 341: ^ 1, 2, 3). 
On the evening of May 31, 2002, Mr. Raab was working as the conductor on 
a Utah Railway coal train approaching Soldier Summit, from which it would 
descend through Provo Canyon. Mr. Raab and his engineer discovered that the 
dynamic brake on the train's lead locomotive did not work, which meant the train 
would go too fast while descending through the canyon. (R. at 341-42: ^ 3, 4, 5). 
The dynamic brake uses the electric motors to slow the locomotive. An air 
brake applies against the wheels of every car and locomotive in the train. It is 
common to use both the dynamic and air brakes in order to safely control speed in 
mountainous territories. (R. at 341-42: f 4, 5, FN. 3). 
After reaching the summit Mr. Raab and his engineer dealt with the safety 
problem by removing and replacing the lead locomotive in the train with another 
locomotive equipped with a properly functioning dynamic brake. They then had to 
shuffle and reconnect four trailing locomotives as part of the replacement. This 
created a rebuilt front locomotive array, known as a front consist. In this way they 
would adequately control descending speed and get the train moving again. (R. at 
342: ^[5; 453). 
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During the rebuilding of the front consist, Mr. Raab entered the cabs of the 
various trailing locomotives. While working for these purposes in a dark trailing 
locomotive, Mr. Raab, who is 6 foot 4 inches tall in his work boots, struck the top 
of his head on an air conditioning unit installed into and forming a portion of an 
abnormally low locomotive cab ceiling. This occurred when he entered the cab 
through its 5 foot 6 inch entry door and then stood erect, driving the top of his head 
into the 5 foot 10-11 inch ceiling. The force was severe enough to cause several of 
Mr. Raab's cervical discs to herniate. (R. at 342-43 ^ 5, 6, 7, 8. R. at 453. R. at 
376, Interrogatory No. 1. R. at 367-68, fl[4 Allan Tencer). R. at 659, ^12. R. at 
714-16 ffifl-8 (Scott Tucker Affidavit).) 
Summary of Arguments 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on Mr. Raab's defective brake 
claim is manifest error. It ignored established Utah law that causation is almost 
always a fact issue in ordinary tort cases. It also ignored the Utah Court of 
Appeals' recent description of the even more relaxed FELA causation standard in 
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co,, 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 
(2006), as well as a long line of controlling FELA causation decisions by federal 
courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on Mr. Raab's LIA low ceiling 
claim is also manifest error. It ignored established federal law that neither a 
mechanical defect of the particular locomotive part involved, nor a violation of a 
specific Federal Railroad Administration regulation, is necessary to invoke liability 
under the LIA. It ignored longstanding federal law holding that evidence 
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demonstrating that any circumstance which renders the locomotive unsafe to 
operate without unnecessary danger to the crew creates a violation of LIA. And in 
holding Mr. Raab responsible for contributory negligence as a matter of law, it 
ignored a long line of controlling FELA causation decisions by federal courts of 
appeal and the United States Supreme Court, as well as this Court's recent 
description of the FELA causation standard in Christiansen v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266 (2006). 
Argument 
1. The FELA's causation standard requires that a jury determine 
whether the brake defect in Utah Railway Co. 's lead locomotive caused Mr. Raab 
to become injured in another locomotive while replacing the lead locomotive. 
The FELA, at 45 U.S.C. § 51, provides that a railroad is liable to its 
employee for injury "resulting in whole or in part" from the railroad's negligence 
or violation of an attendant federal safety statute. One such safety statute is the 
Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 etseq. 
Utah Railway Co. argued, and the trial court agreed, that the lead 
locomotive's brake defect could not be a cause of Mr. Raab's injury as a matter of 
law because Mr. Raab had decoupled that locomotive, set it aside, and was finished 
with it. Because it was not part of the consist Mr. Raab was rebuilding when he 
injured his head and neck in one of the trailing locomotives, the trial court held, 
'There's no connection." (R. at 932:62). 
This legal conclusion is manifestly contrary to Utah's rule that "Generally, 
causation cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Proximate cause is an issue of 
fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer 
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causation, is summary judgment appropriate." Kilpatrick v. Riley, Wein & 
Fielding, supra, 909 P.2d at 1292 (citations omitted) (reversing entry of summary 
judgment on causation). "In other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of 
the elements of causation on summary judgment." Id. 
Utah also holds that "Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any 
cause of action. In Utah, c[p]roximate causation is [t]hat cause which in natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces 
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Id. 
Such a natural and continuous sequence occurred here. A defective brake 
required Mr. Raab to decide to take the lead locomotive out of service before 
making a descent through the mountains. That required him to replace the lead 
locomotive with a new one. That required him to rebuild the front consist. That 
required him to enter the trailing locomotives to operate and set the controls. That 
caused him to suffer a serious neck injury. This sequence, which started with the 
brake defect and was unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, caused Mr. 
Raab's injury. If the lead locomotive brake had not been defective, Mr. Raab 
would not have had to rebuild the front consist, would not have had to enter the 
dark cab of a trailing locomotive, and would not have been injured as he was. 
Utah Railway's own answer to Mr. Raab's petition for permission to appeal 
the interlocutory order of the trial court states the natural and probable consequence 
of Mr. Raab's injury resulting from the brake defect in locomotive unit 5006. "The 
5006 unit was removed from the consist because the engineer thought it had a 
problem with its dynamic brakes." Answer in Opposition pp. 2-3, As a 
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consequence of the defect, after removing unit 5006 from service and while 
remaking the front consist, "Mr. Raab was performing his expected duties of going 
into the trailing locomotive units of the consist of locomotives that had been 
coupled together at the head end, in order the make sure the controls were properly 
positioned. This was necessary to enable the engineer to control those locomotives 
from the cab of the leading unit. It was while Mr. Raab was performing this task" 
that he hit his head. Answer in Opposition p. 3. 
The assessment of the chain of causation which produced Mr. Raab's injury 
is a fact issue for the jury. "To establish causation, plaintiffs must persuade a fact 
finder that their injury was a natural result of the defendant's breach. Plaintiffs 
therefore must spin together myriad facts into a durable thread that reasonably 
connects defendant's breach to plaintiffs injury." Id. These issues "do not lend 
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Id. 
The trial court's error in granting summary judgment on causation for 
plaintiffs defective brake claim is even greater in the context of an FELA case. 
Under the FELA, "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with 
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.'" 
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266, 
1270 (2006), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S. 
Ct, 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957) (emphasis added). 
Rogers is the leading case regarding causation under the FELA and, 
therefore, under the Locomotive Inspection Act. There, the United States Supreme 
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Court set forth the standard, unchanged for more than 50 years, of what facts are 
sufficient to constitute a jury question. In that case, a railroad employee was 
assigned to burn weeds and vegetation along defendant's track. He was given a 
flame thrower and had begun burning the weeds on the day in question. Hearing 
an oncoming train, he stepped back from the tracks and stood near a culvert. The 
passing train fanned the flames on the burning weeds causing the fire to move 
toward him. In attempting to escape harm he fell from the top of the culvert and 
sustained serious injuries. 352 U.S. at 501-502. The railroad appealed a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the decision, 
concluding that the facts did not support liability. 352 U.S. at 501. 
The plaintiff had claimed liability based on his being required to work in 
close proximity to moving trains and on ground conditions that were not safe. 352 
U.S. at 502-503. The Missouri Supreme Court's reversal was based on its 
conclusion that it was his inattention which caused the fire to spread and that this 
was "something extraordinary, unrelated to and disconnected from" the ground 
conditions. 357 U.S. at 504. Just as Utah Railway advocates here, the Missouri 
Supreme Court found as a matter of law, that the ground conditions merely created 
an incidental situation, and that plaintiffs conduct was the sole cause of his 
injuries. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the jury's verdict. 352 U.S. at 503, The Court held: "Under this statute 
the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the 
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in 
13 
producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Id. at 507 (emphasis 
in original). The Court continued, "It does not matter that, from the evidence, the 
jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other 
causes, including the employee's contributory negligence." Id. " Judicial appraisal 
of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited 
to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that 
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death." Id. 
"Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is 
met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the 
evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities." Id. 
Rogers ruled as it did because Congress, in 1939 amendments to the FELA, 
specifically intended "to leave to the fact-finding function of the jury the decision 
of the primary question raised in these cases - whether employer fault played any 
part in the employee's mishap." Id. at 509, 77 S. Ct. at 450. The lower court's 
opinion, which took the causation issue away from the jury, was a "misconception" 
which "fails to take into account the special features of this statutory negligence 
action that make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law 
negligence." Id. 
This persistent misconception "has required this Court to review a number of 
cases. In a relatively large percentage of the cases reviewed, the Court has found 
that lower courts have not given proper scope to this integral part of the 
congressional scheme." Id. at 510, 77 S. Ct. at 450. The Supreme Court then cited 
18 of its opinions which reversed FELA decisions because of the presence of a jury 
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question. Id. at 510 n. 26, 77 S. Ct. at 451 n. 26. 
Even before Rogers, in Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S. 
Ct. 275 (1949), the Supreme Court reversed an FELA directed verdict in Utah state 
court. The plaintiff, who was not watchful, ran into a locomotive which had 
suddenly stopped because of bad brakes. In words directly applicable here, the 
Supreme Court held that FELA and safety act liability "follows from the unlawful 
use of prohibited defective equipment 'not from the position the employee may be 
in, or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured."' Id. at 
523, 69 S.Ct. at 276-77. 
Regarding causation, the Coray Court held, "The language selected by 
Congress to fix liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct Consideration of 
its meaning by the introduction of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful 
interpretive purpose." Id, at 524, 69 S. Ct. at 277. The Court concluded, 
"Congress has thus for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obligations 
upon railroads and has commanded that if a breach of these obligations contributes 
in part to an employee's death, the railroad must pay damages." Id., 69 S. Ct. at 
277. 
Following Rogers, this Court recognizes that "'[a] plaintiffs burden in a 
FELA action . . . is significantly lighter than it would be in an ordinary negligence 
case." Christiansen, supra, 136 P.3d at 1270 (2006), quoting Williams v. National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998). This is "because a jury 
determination *is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers" by the 
statute. Christiansen, supra, 136 P.3d at 1270. "Under the FELA, where liability 
15 
depends largely on the unique circumstances of each case, 'Congress vested the 
power of decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all but the infrequent 
case where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether fault of the employer 
played any part in the employee's injury." Id; quoting Rogers, supra, 352 U.S. at 
510 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, responding to a defendant railroad's characterization that the claim 
against it "contains less substance than broth brewed from the bones of a starved 
pigeon," the Seventh Circuit has noted that "numerous FELA actions have been 
submitted to a jury based upon . . . evidence scarcely more substantial than pigeon 
bone broth." Harbin v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131, 132 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
Many federal and state court decisions have consistently implemented these 
principles over the decades since Congress enacted the FELA in 1908. Mr. Raab 
sets forth two pertinent illustrations here. 
In Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 45 S. Ct. 
303 (1925), the Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the estate of a dead brakeman 
over the railroad's contention of insufficient evidence on causation. A drawbar 
pulled out of a train car. The crew chained the car to the preceding car and pulled 
the entire train onto a siding in order to shuffle the train, leave the defective car 
behind, and resume the trip. During the shuffling the brakeman died in an 
accident. The Supreme Court held the use of the defective car had not ended at the 
time of the accident. "To cut this car out of the train so the latter might proceed to 
destination was the thing in view, an essential part of the undertaking in connection 
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with which the injuries arose." Id. at 291-92, 45 S. Ct. at 304. The brakeman 
"went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car it was necessary 
to detach did not meet the statutory requirements especially intended to protect 
men in his position." Id at 292, 45 S. Ct. at 305. 
In Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 56 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), a 
brakeman walked back to the head of a train after he had successfully disabled 
defectively locked brakes on a car 20 cars back. He did this so the train could 
continue its trip. On the way back from accomplishing his task he stepped into a 
road rut and injured his ankle. The brakeman claimed the brake defect violated the 
Safety Appliance Act, and the violation was a cause of his injury in whole or in 
part under the FELA. The 10th Circuit affirmed denial of the railroad's motion for 
summary judgment on causation, holding "It is undisputed that Mr. Wilson was 
injured while returning from attending to an SAA violation. But for the violation, 
Mr. Wilson would not have been forced to walk on the dark, rutted road where the 
injury occurred." Id. at 1230. The court held, "In this case, where there is no 
suggestion that Mr. Wilson had returned from the repair site or had begin duties 
unrelated to the SAA violation, we find no error in the district court's denial of 
Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment." Id. 
Here, Mr. Raab was still engaged in duties relating to the replacement of the 
defective locomotive when he became injured. His work rebuilding the front 
consist was work at the site of the problem, and placed him squarely within the 
ambit of the defective brake's consequences under the FELA causation standard as 
defined by Schendel and Wilson. Causation here is an issue of fact for the jury. 
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2. In ruling on Mr. Raab 's low ceiling height claim, the trial court 
incorrectly held a piece of air-conditioning equipment, regardless of its dangerous 
placement, must malfunction in order to constitute an actionable defect under the 
Locomotive Inspection Act. 
The FELA, at 45 U.S.C. § 51, provides that a railroad is liable to its 
employee for injury "resulting in whole or in part" from the railroad's violation of 
an attendant federal safety statute. One such safety statute is the Locomotive 
Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq. The LIA makes it unlawful for a railroad 
to use a locomotive on its line unless it is "...in proper condition and safe to 
operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury" (49 U.S.C. § 20701(1)) or 
unless it "can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter." 
(49 U.S.C. §20701(3)). 
Utah Railway argued, and the trial court erroneously agreed, that the 
defective placement of the air conditioner as part of the locomotive's low ceiling 
was not a violation of the LIA as a matter of law because, regardless of its 
placement and any hazard that placement might present, it was otherwise 
functioning properly as an air conditioner. In its Order, the trial court found "There 
is no evidence that the air conditioner in the subject locomotive was 
malfunctioning, defective or broken as the time the plaintiff bumped into it" (sic), 
and that plaintiff ".. .does need to show that his injury was a proximate result of the 
failure of the part in question (AC Unit) to perform properly. In this particular 
case, the plaintiff alleges that the AC Unit was hung too low, reducing the head 
clearance. There is no allegation that there was a defect in the functioning of the 
unit." Order, paragraphs 4-5, page 2. 
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Relevant to this case, a carrier may violate the L1A by failing to keep the 
locomotive and all parts and appurtenances in proper condition and safe to operate 
without unnecessary peril to life or limb, or by failing to comply with regulations 
issued by the Federal Railroad Administration. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. 
Co , 317 U.S. 481, 63 S.Ct. 347 (1943); Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 817 F.2d 
1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1987). 
The LIA is to be liberally construed in the light of its prime purpose, the 
protection of employees, by requiring the use of safe equipment. 49 U.S.C. 20701. 
The Act covers not only defects in construction or mechanical operation, but gives 
protection against any condition which renders the locomotive unsafe, including 
the presence of dangerous objects or foreign matter. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western 
R. Co, supra. In sustaining a jury verdict for plaintiff the Lilly Court held: "The 
use of a tender, upon whose top an employee must go in the course of his duties, 
which is covered with ice seems to us to involve 'unnecessary peril to life or limb'-
enough so as to permit a jury to find that the Boiler Inspection Act [now the LIA] 
has been violated." 317 U.S. 481, 486, 63 S.Ct. 347, 351. 
Many cases since Lilly have made it clear that imposition of absolute 
liability under the LIA does not depend upon the presence of a mechanical defect 
or functional failure of a component. Two relevant examples are Calabritto v. New 
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 F.2d 394 (2nd Cir. 1961) (presence of sand and oil on 
locomotive platform a violation of the LIA, without any mechanical defect with the 
platfonn itself or specific FRA regulation); and Delevie v. Reading Co., 176 F.2d 
496, 497 (3,d Cir. 1949) (power reverse gear mechanism installed horizontally 
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above footwalk made access to cab unsafe; location of that mechanism was a cause 
of the accident). 
Delevie is substantially similar to the case at bar. In Delevie, plaintiffs 
husband was mounting a stationary engine. He fell, suffered severe injuries, and 
eventually died. After a trial, the jury, in answer to a specific interrogatory, found 
that there was no foreign substance on the steps, footwalk, or running board, 
(wiiich were progressively the means of entry to the engine cab), in sufficient 
quantity to make the path to the engine cab unsafe at that time. The jury also 
found, however, that a power reverse gear mechanism installed horizontally above 
the metal footwalk made access to the cab unsafe, and that the location of that 
mechanism was a cause of the accident. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment 
for the plaintiff. Id. at 497. Accord: Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Botts, 
173 F.2d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1949); Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 167 F.2d 934, 
936(2ndCir. 1948). 
In attempting to justify its decision, the trial court's Order also erroneously 
concluded that the LIA can only be implicated when a specific FRA regulation is 
violated. That is not the law. 
A railroad can violate the general safety clause of the Locomotive Inspection 
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701(1), without violating a specific safety regulation. "[E]ven 
if a earner complies with the regulations, it may still violate the Act if the parts or 
appurtenances of its locomotives are otherwise unsafe." Mosco v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad, 817 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 851, 
108 S. Ct. 152(1987). 
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Delevie v. Reading Co., 176 F.2d 496 (3rd Cir. 1949), is again instructive. 
On appeal of a verdict for plaintiff, the railroad argued that the jury should not have 
been permitted to consider the location of the reverse gear mechanism as a basis for 
liability. According to that defendant, (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission 
[now FRA] required the mechanism; (2) as installed in 1941, the gear still left the 
10~inch footwalk clearance required by I.C.C. regulations of long standing; and (3) 
the location of the mechanism was selected by qualified personnel of defendant and 
had passed Interstate Commerce Commission inspections. Id. at 497. 
In response, the Third Circuit held, "The Interstate Commerce Commission 
does not purport to issue a set of regulations so complete and comprehensive that a 
railroad company need only obey its instructions." Id. at 497. The court 
explained, "Defendant had to install a reverse gear mechanism, and had to provide 
a footwalk at least 10 inches in width; but defendant was not promised immunity 
from liability" merely "by placing the mechanism in a spot where a footwalk, 
otherwise 27 inches in width, still protruded about 10 inches beyond the 
mechanism. . . . and the physical set-up which resulted was one which the jury 
found to be unsafe. . . . " Id. "In other words," the Third Circuit held in terms 
directly applicable here, "a locomotive, no single part of which is installed or 
maintained in violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, may still provide an unsafe 
place to work and so violate the Act." Id. 
In Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 167 F.2d 934, 936 (2nd Cir. 1948), and 
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Botts, 173 F.2d 164, 167-168 (8th Cir. 1949), both 
plaintiffs were injured when they fell from locomotive footboards. In both cases, 
21 
the defendant railroads contended that their compliance with an FRA regulation 
about such footboards condemned the plaintiffs LI A case to failure. In response, 
the Bolan court held, "We think such compliance, however, did not relieve 
appellant of its duty under the Boiler Inspection Act to maintain" all 
"appurtenances of its engine (of which the pilot step is one) 'in proper condition 
and safe to operate * * * that the same may be employed in the active service of 
such earner without unnecessary peril to life or limb."' Id, at 936. According to 
the court, "The Commission's regulation . . . merely provides for the number, 
dimensions, location and manner of application of such steps. A step may comply 
with these directions and yet be in a highly dangerous condition because it is worn 
or bent. . . ." Id. The court concluded, "The statute is to be construed in the light 
of its humanitarian objectives. Accordingly, if an appurtenance conforms with the 
I.C.C. regulations but nevertheless violates the Act, the latter must control." Id. 
Likewise, in Botts, the court held: 
The language of the Act affords no basis for the argument 
which appellant makes. It is to be noted that section 2, 45 U.S.C.A. § 
23, (now recodified at 49 USC 20701), provides that a earner may not 
use a locomotive, 'unless' it and all its parts are in proper condition 
and safe to operate, without unnecessary peril to life or limb, in the 
service to which the locomotive is put, ' and unless' it has been 
subjected to the inspections provided for in the Act, ' and" it meets 
such tests 'as may be prescribed' in the rules in regulations of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. (Italics ours.) The effect of this is 
to impose three conditions on a earner's right to use a locomotive. . . . 
These on their face are coordinate conditions and commands, 
and the clauses therefore are not simply coincident. . ., 
Botts, supra, 173 F.2d at 167-8. 
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3, The trial court impermissibly engaged in fact finding and violated Mr. 
Raab's right to a jury determination under the FELA on whether the low ceiling 
was a cause, in whole or in part, of his injury 
Even though Utah Railway Co. did not argue for the premise, the trial court 
also ruled as a matter of law that the low ceiling condition could not be a cause of 
Mr. Raab's injury because it found his failure to see and avoid the low ceiling was 
the sole cause of his injury, saying, "The undisputed facts in this case establish that 
this is a case of non-attention incident to operation and therefore appropriate for 
summary judgment denying liability under FLIA." Exhibit 1, February 11, 2008 
Order, paragraph 8, page 3. 
However, under ordinary Utah law, "Generally, causation cannot be resolved 
as a matter of law. Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no 
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment 
appropriate." Kilpatrick v. Riley, Wein & Fielding, supra, 909 P.2d at 1292 
(citations omitted) (reversing entry of summary judgment on causation). "In other 
words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the elements of causation on 
summary judgment." Id. 
Utah also holds that "Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any 
cause of action. In Utah, 4[p]roximate causation is [tjhat cause which in natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces 
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Id. 
The trial court's error in granting summary judgment on causation against 
plaintiffs defective low ceiling claim is even greater in the context of an FELA 
case. Under the FELA, "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify 
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with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.'" 
Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2006 UT App 180, 136 P.3d 1266, 
1270 (2006), quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S. 
Ct. 443, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957) (emphasis added). 
Instead of following Lilly and Delevie, however, the trial court held the state 
case ofEhalt v. McCarthy, 138 P.2d 646 (Utah 1943) controlled as a matter of law. 
But Ehart was a case where no defect with the locomotive was alleged or proven. 
There, plaintiff was driving a steam locomotive, and failed to check the water level 
sight glass. Solely because of that neglect, he and his co-worker ran the steam 
engine out of water, causing it to overheat and explode. Ehart's own proof in the 
case was that there was nothing unsafe about the steam locomotive, except that it 
will overheat if its water is not replenished. The Utah Supreme Court held this was 
a case where Ehart's conduct was the sole cause of the explosion. 
Here, on summary judgment, in order to reach the result it did, the trial court 
would necessarily have had to engage in fact finding, discounting Raab's 
allegations of an abnormally low ceiling created by the AC Unit placement, and 
instead finding that his conduct alone in not seeing and avoiding the low ceiling 
was the sole cause of his injuries. Factual determinations of this nature are 
impermissible under the FELA/LIA scheme. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 
66S.Q. 740, 744(1946). 
Causation here is an issue of fact for the jury. 
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Conclusion 
Mr. Raab requests this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings granting 
summary judgment to Utah Railway, to remand the matter to the trial court 
reinstating Mr. Raab's claims under the LI A and FELA as consistent with this 
brief, and to award Mr. Raab his costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal. 
Dated this 3rd day of September, 2008. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - DECEMBER 11, 2007 
JUDGE L. A. DEVER PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 
This is the matter of Raab vs. Utah Railway Company, 
050908773. If you would like to enter your appearances for 
the record. 
MR. THOMPSON: Good morning Your Honor, Stephen 
Thompson with Kirklin Folawn for plaintiff, Scott Raab. 
MR. MCGARVEY: And Casey McGarvey and Susan Barrett 
with me from Berman & Savage for the defendant, Utah Railway. 
THE COURT: This is on for various motions, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion 
to Compel, etc. So I guess we should proceed with the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. McGarvey, if you would like to proceed. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
One of the issues for summary judgment, as you know from 
reading your material and I know that you do that, pertains 
to the dynamic brake which is directly related to the 
discovery motions as well, so I think it is wise that we 
address that particular issue first and let me talk about 
that. I believe it's clear but just to make sure, the 
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1 \ context of what I'm about to say this morning, just want to 
2 j make sure that it's clear that we understand the plaintiff in 
3 ; this case, Mr. Raab, is a conductor for the railroad. What 
4 I that means is that he's responsible for the trains that he 
5 operates on. There are two members of the crews, typically 
6 the conductor and the engineer and this particular evening of 
7 j May 31, 2002 the engineer was Mr. Booth. As the conductor 
8 : and being responsible for the train, it would be Mr. Raab's 
9 i responsibility to check the train out and make sure it was in 
10 j proper condition to move and to be operated. The engineer 
11 then would move it. If there was a problem with the train 
12 the conductor would go back and take care of it. Sometimes 
13 I trains break"in two with couplers that malfunction. It would 
i 
14 i be his responsibility then to check that out and to do that. 
15 J Part of his responsibilities includes not only riding in 
16 I locomotive cabs but going through and being in locomotive 
17 j cabs to perform his regular, ordinary duties as a conductor. 
18 With that understanding, the position with respect 
19 j to the allegation that a defective dynamic brake caused his 
20 j injury on this particular injury cannot stand because there's 
21 j no causation. It's too far removed. It cannot be said that 
22 before the fact that there was a dynamic brake failure, 
23 assuming that there was, on a 5006 locomotive, that's the 
24 designation of the particular unit, that Raab would not have 
25 | bumped his head on the air conditioner. We could just easily 
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say that had Mr. Raab not been assigned to that particular 
job but had another job, that particular job was to take a 
coal train down from the summit into Provo, had he been 
assigned to another job he would not have bumped his head. 
He may have on a different locomotive but I mean, we can also 
say that had he had a different assignment he would not have 
been in that position and not had to do those particular 
duties, wherein he was caused to go into a 6000 series 
locomotive where he ended up bumping his head. With the 
brake failure, just like being assigned to that particular 
job, Mr. Raab could have gone into the cab of the 6000 series 
locomotive like others had before and after he did on that 
night without bumping his head. There's nothing unique about 
the brake failure that caused him to bump his head. The 
brake failure set up circumstances where his job duties were 
perhaps different than they would have been had there not 
been a brake failure but his job duties still required him to 
go inside locomotives and it didn't cause him to stand up too 
soon and bump his head. 
Likewise, without any brake failure, just like 
being assigned to that particular job, Mr. Raab still could 
have had occasion to go into a 6000 series locomotive like he 
and others had prior to and after this particular incident 
and then still could have stood up too soon after ducking 
through the doorway and still have bumped his head, even if 
3 
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1 I there had been no brake failure. 
So, although there was an allegation here of a 
brake failure which is being assumed for purposes of this 
particular motion, that particular condition or problem or 
defect or violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act or 
negligence or whatever liability prong is relied upon, can't 
be a cause of Mr. Raab's alleged injuries in being in a 
completely differently locomotive doing duties he would have 
to do of making sure the train was to operate where he just 
happened to bump his head at that time but hadn't on any 
other time. 
There's nothing about the dynamic brake and the 
5006 that changes the fact that if you don't stand up too 
soon you won't bump you head or if you do stand up too soon, 
you will bump your head. The same thing can be said of 
chairs. There's chairs inside these locomotives. He could 
have gone in and bumped his knee against a chair. There are 
steps in these locomotives. He could have missed a step and 
tripped. Just because on this particular occasion be stood 
up too soon doesn't tie it to the fact that the dynamic brake 
caused that to happen here. 
So the law is that there must be a causation. I 
think even Raab admits in his papers that causation is 
critical and Raab's arguments, I believe Your Honor, misses 
the point of the railroad's motion or position on its motion 
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here and that is that Raab's point is that the causation 
standard is something less than proximate cause. I think 
that that's really an immaterial point and doesn't address 
the issue here and whether or not Raab is right on that 
really depends on the definition of proximate cause. If the 
definition of proximate cause is as some states have held in 
common law that the defendant's conduct must be the sole 
cause as was the law in Missouri, the law that the Rogers 
Court was considering, then he's correct. The FELA doesn't 
have, doesn't require that definition of proximate cause. If 
the definition is as in Utah, just simply substantial fact or 
efficient cause, then clearly the FELA does require causation 
and proximate cause under that standard and the Supreme Court 
cases on numerous occasions talked about there need for being 
proximate cause. 
The thrust of the plaintiff's argument really, 
although immaterial - just to make sure that we're clear -
boils down to if the defendant is one percent at fault then 
the case proceeds and we agree with that, everyone is in 
agreement. Our point simply is is that there is no 
causation, assuming that the brakes failed, that there was a 
violation of a statute of negligence or whatever, there 
cannot from that fault even be one percent proximate cause 
just because it's too far removed. 
So the particular discussion of Rogers and all of 
14 
that really doesn't apply here but just want to make sure 
that we're all clear on what Rogers really stands for is 
simply that one percent then that' s sufficient to go to a 
jury, one percent of negligence. it's not something as many 
courts had construed as Sorell in Kearns discussed and that 
is some sort of concept of slight negligence. What is that? 
Or slight causation. What is that? Is that almost 
negligence but not quite? 
THE COURT: Pardon me for interrupting you, 
counsel, but is it your position that if I grant the Motion 
for Summary Judgment and say that the dynamic brake issue on 
5006 has no relevance to the injury here, that that ends the 
case? 
MR. MCGARVEY: No, absolutely not. I do not. I say 
that ends the issue with respect to the dynamic brake. 
THE COURT: I mean, there's still an issue of 
whether or not the railroad negligently installed an air 
conditioning unit, isn't there? 
MR. MCGARVEY: Absolutely. If I just said anything 
to imply that we thought it ended the case then I misspoke 
and did not intend that. No, only as to the issue with 
respect to the dynamic brake, Your Honor. We still have an 
issue in this case with respect to the air conditioner on 
which Mr. Raab bumped his head and taking the dynamic brake 
issue out of the case does not prohibit the plaintiff from 
15 
moving forward on that other theory. 
THE COURT: So what exactly are you asking me to do 
here today? 
MR. MCGARVEY: I'm asking you here with respect to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment on the dynamic brake, because 
it is an express allegation and position of the plaintiff 
that the railroad is liable because the dynamic brake failed 
to rule as a matter of law that that cannot be a basis for 
liability. So for purposes of the motion, assuming it did 
fail, as a matter of law Utah Railway cannot be held 
responsible or liable to the plaintiff because of that 
failure simply because there is no legal causation from that 
brake. 
The cases cited on causation cited by Raab, just to 
touch on them briefly, Your Honor, Coreh involved a train 
that had a defect in the brake and the train stopped on the 
track. The plaintiff in that case was injured directly 
because the train stopped by running into that stopped train. 
I submit that that is a much different case than the case 
here. 
Other cases cited by plaintiff are similar in that 
there's a direct relationship between the injury and the 
particular defect at issue and problem with the train. That 
is not the case here. Mr. Raab didn't bump his head because 
the brake failed and certainly could have bumped his head in 
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going through that locoraotive or any locomotive or tripped or 
hit. his knee or anything else despite a dynamic brake 
failure. 
So I think, you know, I don't want to restate it 
again and again in different ways. I think that you 
understand the point on that particular motion that we have. 
Unless you have any questions, I'd like to move to 
the next one. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MCGARVEY: The next Motion for Summary Judgment 
does pertain to the air conditioner and just from the outset 
let me also make sure it' s clear that this motion, if 
granted, also would not do away with this case. There would 
still be an issue in this case. The air conditioner is 
alleged to be a basis for liability on two prongs. One, it's 
claimed to be a violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act; 
and two, it's alleged to constitute negligence. Our motion 
does not address the second prong, negligence. It only 
addresses liability based upon a violation of the Locomotive 
Inspection Act. So by granting this particular motion, the 
Court would be ruling that defendant cannot be liable because 
of the existence of the air conditioner under the Locomotive 
Inspection Act. Rather, plaintiff's case would go forward 
simply under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, Negligence 
Provisions. 
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THE COURT: I'm sorry, counsel, but I have missed 
something because the only memo that I have from you talks 
about the dynamic brake. I don't have anything that talks 
about anything about an air conditioning unit. 
MR. MCGARVEY: I just have to then just absolutely 
apologize to Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have what I considered to be the 
entire thing which said it was and everything. I went 
through all of that and there's not one thing in there about 
an air conditioning unit. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Yeah -
THE COURT: From either side. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Then I have to absolutely apologize, 
it was my understanding that we had submitted all the briefs 
on that motion and I just am so embarrassed, Your Honor, that 
that did not happen.1 
THE COURT: If you did, I didn't get a copy. 
Understand, gentlemen, I don't go through the files. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Oh, I understand. 
THE COURT: I look at the courtesy copies that are 
sent to me and my clerk says this is everything I've got. I 
have looked and there's not one thing about an air 
conditioner from either side. 
MR. MCGARVEY: I just feel terrible because I 
thought that had happened last week, that all the briefs on 
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both sides had been submitted and I know that the Court had 
especially set this to address ail those so I am so sorry 
that that occurred and it appears then that for our fault 
that we're not in a position to talk about that. 
What would you like us to do, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and talk about 
it and then I will review the memos when I find them or get 
them to make a decision on that issue. I mean, I've read 
everything about the other issues. So why don't you just go 
ahead and tell me what your position is and we'll hopefully 
find something out from the memos when I get them. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Okay. The second Motion for Summary 
Judgment that pertains to the air conditioner simply was that 
the railroad cannot be held liable for a violation of the 
Locomotive Inspection Act. The case would still go forward 
on the basis of the air conditioner being a basis for 
liability, it's existence being a basis for liability. 
The Locomotive Inspection Act has three prongs to 
it. One pertains to inspections occurring in accordance with 
that statute and regulations under it. There really has been 
no evidence or argument by the plaintiff that there have not 
been inspections that have occurred in accordance with what 
was required under the statute to regulations. 
Another prong is that there can be a violation if 
some test prescribed by the regulations, by the Federal 
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Railroad Administration has not, the locomotive or parts do 
not comply with some test that they prescribe. There really 
has not been any evidence or argument on that point. 
The last prong is the general prong and that is 
that locomotive and parts must be in proper condition and 
safe to operate without unnecessary peril to life and limb 
and it's under that general provision really that the 
plaintiffs claim that the existence of the air conditioner is 
a violation of that particular provision of the statute and 
it's our position, Your Honor, that the air conditioner was 
in proper condition. It worked as an air conditioner. It 
wasn't malfunctioning. It wasn't leaking fluid. It didn't 
have any material, any snow or ice or any slippery material 
or anything on it. There was nothing about it that caused 
Mr. Raab to bump his head on it. The argument of the 
plaintiff here is that its mere existence is a violation of 
the statute and we've pointed out that there are no 
regulations or standards that pertain to high clearance or 
ceiling clearance or anything that would prohibit the 
existence of an air conditioner and we cited in the briefing, 
Your Honor, cases that talk about that there must be a 
defect, some malfunction or something wrong with the part and 
in this case there wasn't anything wrong, it just merely 
existed and the plaintiff happened to hit his head against 
it. There were cases cited by the plaintiff and one I think 
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1 I highlights the importance of this. One of the cases they 
cited had a reverse gear that a railroad worker had to 
maneuver in order to get into a cab. He didn't hit himself 
on the reverse gear but that reverse gear inhibited his 
ability to grab onto a grab iron in order to support himself 
and because, as the Court found, it made it particular 
difficult to grab onto the iron, they found that that could 
be a basis for a violation of this particular act and we 
submit, Your Honor, that the existence then of the reverse 
gear in that case made sense because it created a dangerous 
condition. 
Here however, there's nothing about the air 
conditioner that made it difficult for Mr. Raab to do 
anything to protect his safety. He had to duck even lower 
than the air conditioner just simply to get through the cab 
door. There are other places in a cab that you would have to 
duck if you were going to go. Unfortunately locomotives are 
limited in the space that they have. The cabs are small and 
he happened to hit his head on the air conditioner just like 
he could have hit his knee on a chair or hit anything else 
but that doesn't mean that the chair or the console or the 
step is a defect or renders the locomotive, as the standard 
says, not in proper condition and unsafe to operate without 
unnecessary peril to life. Unfortunately, there are dangers 
associated with locomotives and congress has not seen fit to 
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rule or to enter a statute that all injuries, no matter what, 
are the responsibility of the railroad. The statute rather 
did, if there7 s negligence or if there is a violation of a 
safety statute and the issue here is as a matter of law, 
there cannot be liability under the basis of the violation of 
this particular safety statute. 
Also in the plaintiff's opposition they raise 
subsequent remedial measures in that they point out that 
although Mr. Raab was the first person who Utah Railway knew 
of who had bumped their head on this locomotive, another 
employee a year or over a year later also had bumped his head 
and the railroad after that then took out the air 
conditioners and we submit that that subsequent act can't be 
a basis for liability and it certainly can't be a basis for 
finding that the statute was applicable and was violated in 
this particular case. 
The Court should know that this series of 
locomotives consisted of a group of locomotives, not just one 
that had these air conditioners. They came to Utah Railway 
with the air conditioners installed from another company from 
which they were purchased. They were in use for nearly a 
year before Mr. Raab had bumped his head on it and there had 
been no complaints or anything to indicate to Utah Railway 
that anybody would bump their head as opposed to just simply 
ducking until they were out from under it. And like all 
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locomotives that are required to be inspected on a regular 
basis for compliance with federal regulations, there is no 
evidence that anybody ever determined that these locomotives 
were in violation of any federal railroad administration 
regulation, that it never was cited, never had to pay any 
penalty because of the existence of the air conditioners. 
And so the basis of our motion simply is in light 
of the case law and what's required for there to be a 
violation, there simply, as a matter of law, cannot be 
liability based on the violation of that statute. The 
plaintiff can go forward and argue that, you know, although 
not a violation the railroad shouldn't have had it, a 
reasonable person wouldn't have had it, that there can be a 
claim of negligence in which case the railroad also can argue 
that the plaintiff contributorily was negligent and should 
have continued to duck until he took another step and was out 
from underneath it. 
So those are the two motions for summary judgment 
that the railroad has brought. If the Court grants the 
railroad's first one regarding the dynamic brake, that also 
moots the discovery motions in that the plaintiff seek 
discovery, more discovery than what already had been provided 
regarding the dynamic brake and the Court then would have to 
- if that motion is denied, would then have to find that the 
particular discovery that they request warrants the 
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additional interrogatories and requests that are beyond that 
allowed under the rules. So that's a basis, but the real 
basis is - and we don't want to hold back any information 
that this Court finds to be relevant - but the true basis for 
not providing that discovery is it's definitely not believed 
to be relevant because of the issue that the dynamic brake is 
too far out there and really has nothing to do with liability 
in this case. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Again, I apologize. 
MR. THOMPSON: Good morning Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Thompson. 
MR. THOMPSON: I'd like to spend my time helping 
14 I the Court narrow and focus the issue first with respect to 
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the dynamic brake issue on the Utah Railway 506. The parties 
agree for the purposes of this motion that the dynamic brake 
was non-operative and that that would constitute a defect and 
the parties agree that the issue of causation is a necessary 
element under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the parties 
agree that the causation standard for both the FELA claim and 
the Locomotive Inspection Act is that of the FELA under 45, 
United States Code Section 51. 
The Court's examination of this issue I would think 
would begin directly at the statute because the statute 
dynamically changed the common law existent at the time FELA 
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was passed. The statute says that a railroad is responsible 
to its employees for its negligence which is a cause in whole 
or in part and that was a radical change from the common law 
as it existed at that time. The statute has been interpreted 
by the United States Supreme Court through the liberal policy 
behind the FELA also exemplified by Congress in terms of 
passing the act to create liberal recovery on the part of the 
employee. Rogers vs. Missouri Pacific, United States Supreme 
Court 1957 is the sentinel case that defines for all courts 
what the causation standard under the FELA actually is. 
In that case the Court held as follows: Under this 
statute, the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs 
justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence 
played any part, even the slightest in producing the injury 
or death for which damages are sought. 
The Supreme Court has defined the in whole or in 
part standard of the statute to mean just that, that if 
employer conduct played any part, even the slightest in 
bringing about the injury then the employer is responsible 
and more importantly what Rogers stands for, the case must be 
submitted to the jury because the case makes it clear that 
Congress intended a greater percentage of these cases go to 
the jury and be determined by the jury because that's part of 
the FELA remedy and all of those materials are cited in my 
briefs. 
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The court went on to say that "The kind of mis-
perception evidenced in the opinion below", that is the 
Missouri Supreme Court, "which fails to take into account the 
special features of this statutory negligence action that 
make it significantly different from the ordinary common law 
negligence action has required this court to review a number 
of cases. In a relatively large percentage of the cases 
reviewed this Court has found that the lower courts have not 
given proper scope to this integral part of the congressional 
scheme." 
We reach the same conclusion in this case, that is 
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Rogers. It then 
goes on to say, this important (inaudible). "The decisions 
of this court after the 1939 amendments teach that the 
Congress vested the power of decisions in these actions 
exclusively in the jury and all but the infrequent case where 
fair minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether fault of 
the employer played any part in the employee's injury." 
The evidence in this case, Your Honor, demonstrates 
that there was a defective dynamic brake on the lead 
locomotive of the locomotive consist on the evening of May 
31, 2002 and that Mr. Wood, the engineer and Mr. Raab 
determined that it was not safe because of that defect for 
them to take a 12,000 ton coal train and descend down Provo 
Canyon. In the effort to make that locomotive consist safe 
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1 again so that they could descend that canyon, they were 
2 j required to shuffle or shift a series of locomotives back and 
3 forth which involved not only taking the offending locomotive 
4 j off the point and storing it, but also moving other 
5 locomotives onto the point so they were required to make a 
6 j number of shifting or switching moves with these various 
7 locomotives over the course of about four hours. And the 
8 evidence demonstrates, the record demonstrates in this case 
9 I that Mr. Raab, as part and parcel of that remedy, was 
10 required to either walk back through the locomotive units or 
11 walk back on the ground in order to couple and uncouple 
12 j locomotives and/or isolate those locomotives with their 
13 j electronic isolation button on the back door of the 
14 electrical panel and/or switch the control panels in those 
15 following locomotives into a position where they would all 
16 I operate automatically from the control of the lead locomotive 
17 once the train got underway, a condition known as multiple 
18 coupled control. 
19 | Now, the Wilson case that I cited to Your Honor in 
20 | our brief which is Wilson vs. Union Pacific at 56 Fed Third 
21 j 1226, a Tenth Circuit Court case from 1995 is a very good 
22 | example of why this case does meet the legal standard for 
23 causation under the Locomotive Inspection Act. In Wilson, 
24 brakes on one of the cars dynamited, that is they 
25 automatically applied causing the train to go into an 
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emergency stop. The cause of that emergency stop was 
defective brake equipment on that particular car, a violation 
of the Safety Appliance Act which, like the Locomotive 
Inspection Act, imposes absolute liability for a defect which 
is a cause in whole or in part for plaintiff's injury. Mr. 
Wilson was required pursuant to his job to walk the train. 
Mr. Wilson actually got to the defect and he actually 
repaired the defect but while walking back to the locomotive 
in order to reboard his train so they could get back 
underway, Mr. Wilson stepped in a number of muddy or frozen 
ruts that were beside the track and injured himself as a 
result of that. 
The railroad, Union Pacific in that case, said that 
there was no causation as a matter of law because it was not 
the defect, the brakes, that actually injured Mr. Wilson but 
instead it was the muddy rut, just as defendant does in this 
case. The Tenth Circuit said that under the Rogers standard 
of causation in whole or in part no matter how slight, that 
Mr. Wilson's injury was within the ambient of the emergency 
caused by the brake and because Mr. Wilson was returning from 
the repair that he had accomplished occasioned by the defect 
he was still within the circumstance or danger created by the 
defect. Wilson is directly on point, Wilson has not been 
overruled. Wilson is out of the Tenth Circuit and is 
controlling in this case and defendant does not contend 
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otherwise. 
Instead, Your Honor, defendant takes the position 
that the causation standard in this case, at least in its 
opening brief, was one that was, if you will, defined by the 
incidental situation of condition standard that was 
originally enunciated in Lang vs. New York Central in 1921. 
I would submit to Your Honor that the doctrine that 
originated in Lang was a very short lived one. It found some 
mention two years later in 1923 in Davis vs. Wolfe although 
the court in Davis found liability for a loose grab iron than 
caused the plaintiff to come off the train even though the 
cause of the force that threw him from the train was arguably 
(inaudible) slack action as opposed to the looseness. The 
railroad in that case made the same argument that defendant 
made here in its arguing papers that the incidental condition 
rule applied. 
Ultimately in 192 6 the court began to move away 
from that in the Juno case which I've cited in my papers at 
Page 14, where again, the train broke in two because of the 
defective coupler, plaintiff walked back to the train and 
tried to get the train together again and while attempting to 
adjust the draw bar, his pry bar slipped, he fell backwards 
and fell off a bridge. The court in that case rejected the 
incidental condition circumstance and applied the in whole or 
in part standard. Rogers, however, being a post 1939 
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amendment case says that those narrow constructions do not 
apply and instead the broad remedial purpose of Rogers is the 
law. 
It is interesting to me, Your Honor, this morning, 
just to give you a rough measure of the credibility of those 
arguments, I shepherdized both the Lang decision and I 
shepherdized the Rogers decision. Lang is 86 years old and 
it's been cited a total of 91 times, none of those recently. 
More importantly, at least a third of those citations are 
highly critical of Lang. In contrast Rogers has been cited 
3222 times in its 50-year history. I think that gives you, 
although not a scientific study, some measure of the impact 
of the Rogers decision upon FELA litigation, particularly in 
a causation hearing. 
In its - well, let me say this, from your 
standpoint, trying to put myself in your shoes to make this 
decision, I had to find my self absolutely stunned that 
defendant failed to cite to you the Rogers case in its 
opening brief. Having practiced FELA litigation for 31 years 
- and I know Mr. McGarvey has done the same - absolutely 
stunned to see a motion against a causation element that does 
not even inform the Court about Rogers. Instead, Your Honor, 
defendant relied upon two cases, the Lang case I've already 
discussed and more importantly Green vs. River Terminal, a 
Sixth Circuit case from 1985. Importantly - and I agree, the 
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opinion does dot the old Lang incidental condition view of 
causation but as I pointed out in my brief, Green was 
overruled and isn't even good law within the circuit from 
which it came. Within a matter of 10 years the Sixth Circuit 
reexamined that standard. Green was decided on the basis of 
the 1931 Sixth Circuit Court case Reats. Reats relied upon 
Lang and relied upon Davis vs. Wolfe language to adapt the 
condition or circumstance rule for causation. The Sixth 
Circuit said in light of Rogers we reject our own holding. 
We reject the Davis rationale and the Lang rationale and we 
hold that Rogers controls. The Court said this, "We now join 
those Courts that have rejected Reats in the light of Rogers 
and hold that Reats no longer is good law. Courts in Safety 
Appliance Act and FELA and Locomotive Inspection Act cases as 
well should focus on whether a reasonable jury could conclude 
that the defective appliance played any part, even the 
slightest, in bringing about the plaintiff's injury. This 
means that if a reasonable jury could find that the 
plaintiff's injury was within the risk created by the 
defective appliance, the plaintiff's right to a jury trial 
should be preserved. For example, if as a result of a 
defective appliance a plaintiff is required to take action 
and he or she is injured while taking those actions, the 
issue of causation generally should be submitted to a jury." 
That's exactly what Mr. Raab was doing here. That's exactly 
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Lastly, Your Honor, and perhaps most significantly, 
I think given the acrimony in this case and the energy that 
the parties have put into this case which I think is obvious 
to the Court, whatever decision you make in this case, Your 
Honor, is likely to end up before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
That is particularly troubling to me because defendants in 
their opening brief failed to cite to you Christensen vs. 
Union Pacific Railroad. Christensen holds as a matter of law 
that the Utah Court of Appeals will follow Rogers and will 
apply Rogers. 
In that case the court said the following, "We 
assess whether Christensen has met this burden, that is a 
Motion for Summary Judgment for causation, by viewing his 
case in light of the applicable substantive evidentiary 
standard of proof" "and a firm denial of the motion if 
Christensen has provided a minimum of evidence to allow a 
'fair minded jury' uto return a verdict for you." Under this 
statute, that is the FELA, the test of a jury case is simply 
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whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that 
employer negligence played any part even the slightest, in 
providing the injury or death for which damage are sought, 
citing Rogers vs. Missouri. 
The court then goes on to say and I quote, "Under 
FELA, where liability depends largely upon unique 
circumstances of each case, Congress vested the power of 
decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all but 
the infrequent cases where fair minded jurors cannot honestly 
differ whether fault of the employer played any part in the 
employee's injury" citing Rogers once again. Not only is 
Christensen significant for its language in terms of adapting 
and applying to Utah the broad Rogers standard of causation 
in FELA litigation in this state. 
Mr. McGarvey and Mr. Savage knew that before they 
filed this motion because they were counsel of record for 
defendant Union Pacific Railroad in Christensen and yet they 
failed to cite this case to the Court. I think that is 
significant in and of itself Your Honor because that says 
that in fact Rogers is indeed the rule followed by this state 
and will be applied in this matter. 
THE COURT: Mr. Thompson, if this at all - the 
dynamic brake issue and the removal of 5006 that occurred the 
week before the injury, would there be liability by the 
railroad? 
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MR. THOMPSON: I'm not sure I understand, Your 
Honor, Do you mean if the 506 had not been there that night? 
THE COURT: No. Let's say that it was a week 
earlier that the 506 had a problem and Mr. Raab hit his head 
a week later still in this other rail car. Would there still 
be a connection? 
MR. THOMPSON: Oh, I see. I see. In other words, 
you're drawing out the time continuation. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. THOMPSON: Well, the answer to that would 
depend on whether Mr. Raab spent a week trying to repair the 
dynamic brake and I think your hypothetical implies that was 
not the case and I think to answer your question, 
dynamically, the issue that is fundamental here to the 
causation envelope is whether or not the employee was engaged 
in the remedy of the defect at the time of the injury. If in 
fact as the Wilson court says, Mr. Wilson had actually 
returned safely to the locomotive and they had gotten 
underway and he then had an injury where he bumps his knee or 
bumps his head or all the other pretty horribles that Mr. 
21 | McGarvey has suggested, then the answer is no because the 
22 I remedy had been affected and the danger posed by the defect 
I 
23 | had been ameliorated. I would completely agree. But that's 
| 
24 j not the case here with Mr. Raab and that's what's critical. 
25 Factual issues, the factual record in this case says he was 
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in that locomotive because the dynamic was a defect that had 
stopped progress of his train and he and Mr. Wood were still 
in the process of remedying that defect to make the train 
safe to proceed down Provo Canyon when he was injured. 
Therefore, he was within the envelope of the defect. I hope 
that's clear. 
THE COURT: I understand your position. 
MR. THOMPSON: Thusly, Your Honor, I want to 
briefly talk about the Sorrel case. Sorrel is a 2007 Supreme 
Court case which defendant cited in its brief. 
Let me preface it by one thing, in its response 
reply brief, essentially I understand defendant to be 
dropping the incidental condition or situation defense and 
instead asking this Court to grasp onto the talisman of 
proximate cause. I will be the first to agree that there is 
much language within the FELA that says proximate cause is 
necessary under the FELA. There are many cases that say that 
and there is this great confusion about whether it's a 
proximate cause standard or an actual cause standard or 
whether the proximate cause has been done away with 
altogether and frankly I find it all very unfortunate because 
proximate cause, as we know from our struggle with Mrs. 
Fallsgraph in law school, is a term that means different 
things to different people and therefore, means nothing to 
most of us in terms of trying to decide these issues. 
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the plaintiff's claim against the railroad and the railroad's 
claim for contributory negligence against the plaintiff. 
Clearly unfair. It didn't apply the same standard and the 
court took that issue on, certified that case for certiorari 
took that issue and said no, that's not - we're going to say 
that's not fair. That was the issue cited by Sorrel. Once 
cert was granted however, Northfork and Western tried to -
I'm sorry, Millfork Southern tried to, if you will, bootstrap 
the further issue of what is the causation standard in the 
FELA. The court rejected that but Justice Suitter in 
comments in his concurring opinion talked about the proximate 
cause standard. That a 3-person concurrence is not binding. 
It's informative and perhaps gives us some guidance but at 
the same time what I want to draw your attention to is the 
concurrence of Justice Ginsburg which I think may be the most 
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eloquent explanation of all of this confusion about proximate 
cause that I've read in the entirety of the FELA litigation. 
Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence says the following, "The 
Court today simply holds" I'm sorry, "holds simply and only 
that in cases under the Federal Employer's Liability Act 
railroad negligence and employee contributory negligence are 
governed by the same causation standard. I concur in that 
judgment. It should be recalled however that the Court has 
several times stated what a plaintiff must prove to warrant 
submission of an FELA case to a jury. That question is long 
so we have no cause to reexamine it and I do not read the 
Court's decision to cast a shadow of a doubt on the matter." 
In Consolidated Rail Corporation vs. Gottschall, we 
acknowledge that a "relaxed causation standard applies under 
FELA." In Crane vs. Cedar Rapids we said that an FELA 
plaintiff need to prove "only that his injury resulted in 
whole or in part from the railroad's violation." Both 
decision refer to the Court's off sided opinion in Rogers vs. 
Missouri which declared "under FELA, the test of a jury case 
is simply whether the proof is justified with reason the 
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages 
are sought." 
Rogers, in turn, drew upon Coreh vs. Southern 
Pacific in which the court observed "Congress imposed 
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extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads and has 
conuaanded that if a breach of these obligations continues in 
part to an employee's death, the railroad must pay damages." 
These decisions answer the question Northfork sought to 
''smuggle into" this case. What is the proper standard of 
causation for railroad negligence under FELA? Todays opinion 
leaves in place precedent solidly establishing that the 
causation standard in FELA actions is more relaxed than tort 
litigation generally. And this is what she says that I think 
is the touchstone for all of us, "A few further points bear 
emphasis. First, it is sometimes said that Rogers eliminated 
proximate cause in FELA actions." She makes citations that I 
won't trouble you with. "During the first half of this 
century is was customary for courts to analyze liability 
under FELA in terms of proximate causation. It would be more 
accurate as I see it" she says, "to recognize that Rogers 
described the test for proximate causation applicable in FELA 
suits. That test is whether employer negligence played any 
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death 
for which damages are sought." 
In other words, what Justice Ginsburg is telling us 
is that proximate causation as discussed in all these many 
cases all these years means exactly what Rogers said, in 
whole or in part, even in the slightest. That is a means, 
Your Honor, by which you can reconcile all of these cases to 
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produce a consistent result that is consistent with the 
authorities that will be applied to determine this decision; 
that is, Coreh vs Southern Pacific and the Rogers decision in 
the Supreme Court; Wilson and Standard out of the Tenth 
circuit; and Christensen out of your own Utah Court of 
Appeals. Under all of those Your Honor, I would ask the 
7 i motion be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Anything further Mr. McGarvey? 
MR. MCGARVEY: I think I want to address -
MR. THOMPSON: Shall I address the summary judgment 
issue with respect to the — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I don't know what has 
happened here but I can only tell you this, I personally put 
my Motion in Opposition into the mail to you and sent a cover 
letter with it, a bench copy to you and I'm stunned that it 
hasn't arrived because it hasn't come back. 
THE COURT: Things - we get literally thousands of 
documents filed in this courthouse and this is everything. 
The latest thing I have from you is let's see, I got the 
November 30 binder which supposedly has everything but it 
didn't have that in it and then I have the November 20, 
November 16 letters from you and neither one of those contain 
anything about additional interrogatories and requests for 
30 
39 
decision but.... 
COURT CLERK: (inaudible). 
THE COURT: There is something that's been filed 
here, of course, as I said gentlemen, maybe that's my fault. 
Maybe I should look at the file as well but (inaudible) of 
those memos are here in the file. The problem is as I said, 
I didn't look at the file I looked at what was given to me 
so. . . 
MR. THOMPSON: My understanding of the rule and I 
looked at several of the bench copy rules from some of your 
colleagues, my understanding was that the moving party, 
according to our last conversation was always responsible for 
everything responsible for that motion. 
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MR. THOMPSON: All right. We begin, Your Honor 
with the second Motion for Summary Judgment which is 
essentially defendant's claim that the air conditioner in the 
6000 class locomotive in which Mr. Raab struck the top of his 
head and herniated the disc in his neck as a result of that 
compressive blow, cannot as a matter of law rise to the level 
of a defect actionable under the Locomotive Inspection Act. 
I'm concerned because the Court hasn't had the opportunity to 
read the papers in this case but essentially -
THE COURT: I'll read the papers before I make that 
decision, that's for sure. 
MR. THOMPSON: And I understand. I appreciate 
that. Defendant essentially takes the position that only a 
mechanical defect can rise to the level of a defect 
actionable under the Locomotive Inspection Act and nothing 
could be truer. It says in his papers that essentially it's 
headline is liability under LIA is limited to mechanical 
defects. In Lilly which I will submit to you the touchstone 
case in the area of Locomotive Inspection Act defects and 
Lilly is United Supreme Court case found at 317 U.S. 481. 
Lilly was a case where there was no mechanical defect with 
respect to the tender on steam locomotives whatsoever. There 
was the predecessor to the Federal Railroad Administration, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, the ICC had a rule that 
precluded water from pooling on it but it didn't mention ice. 
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There as a coating of ice over the top of the tender which 
made it slippery and Mr. Lilly was injured while trying to 
put water into the tender, he slipped on the ice and fell and 
was seriously injured. The railroad took the position that 
because there was no mechanical defect on the tender, nothing 
broker, nothing not working, nothing not functional, that in 
fact there was no LIA violation, similar to exactly what 
counsel is arguing here in this case. The court in Lilly 
said the following, "For various cases denying recovery under 
the act, respondent tends to extract a general rule that the 
act covers only defects in construction or mechanical 
operation and affords no protection against the presence of 
dangerous objects or foreign matter. But there is no warrant 
in the language of the act for construing it so narrowly or 
for denying the commission power, commission of the ICC to 
remedy shortcomings other than purely mechanical defects 
which may make operation unsafe." It then says with 
emphasis, "The act without limitation speaks of equipment xin 
proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary 
peril to life or limb.' Conditions other than mechanical 
imperfections can plainly render equipment unsafe to operate 
without unnecessary peril to life or limb." They then go on 
to say, "A use of a tender upon his (inaudible) employee must 
go in the course of his duties which is covered in ice seems 
to us to involve ^unnecessary peril to life or limb' enough 
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so as to permit jury to find the Boiler Inspection Action, 
not the Locomotive Inspection Act has been violated."" In 
other words -
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. If we 
look at the theory about the ice on it, isn't that somewhat 
different than an object that is stationary, that hasn't got 
anything that's caused it to become unsafe, I mean it just 
literally exists. If he had fallen off the roof of the 
tender and the tender was dry, would it have the same result 
as if he fell off the ice? 
MR. THOMPSON: No - well, not under your factual 
circumstance because there would be arguably no unsafe 
condition. I mean, unless there was something else that 
caused him to slip and fall. But he just fell off, no, I 
would agree there would not be a defect because it would not 
make the locomotive unsafe. My argument is this, a 
mechanical defect is not necessary in order to violate the 
act in a finding. 
THE COURT: I understand that point and I assume, 
I'm accepting that as true but then what is the - how then 
does this air conditioning unit fit underneath the theory of 
non-mechanical defective? 
MR. THOMPSON: Because precisely as the Third 
Circuit found in the Delevie vs. Reading case. 
THE COURT: What case? 
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MR. THOMPSON: Delevie D-E-L-E-V-I-E v. Reading, 
R-E-A-D-I-N-G Co., 176 Fed Second 496, Third Circuit 1949. 
That case is substantially similar here and I submit to Your 
Honor controls. Mr. Delevie was an engineer. He was 
boarding an engine which was stationary. There was - and the 
access that he utilized was a set of steps that then went to 
a footboard and a walkway that went alongside of the engine 
up to the cab and I think you can see a factual similarity to 
what we have here whereas Mr. Raab was walking across the 
nose of the locomotive, opened this five foot door that has, 
excuse me, five foot six door that has a window that's about 
five feet high at the top, opens the door and ducks under and 
stands up into a ceiling that's now at least eight to ten 
inches lower than is normally in a locomotive because of this 
after market air conditioner, and strikes his head. In 
Delevie, just like in this case, there was a device which was 
not, in and of itself, non-functional. There was a reverse 
rear gear that was positioned on the locomotive so that it 
jutted out from 
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that's what that has to be connected — 
MR. THOMPSON: That was the proof. That was the 
proof. A jury was - the case when to a jury and the jury 
returned a verdict that said that the reverse gear mechanism 
installed horizontally above the metal footwalk made access 
to the cab unsafe and that the location of that mechanism was 
a cause of the accident and that is precisely the claim that 
is being made here. 
THE COURT: In that case was that sort of an after 
market installation or is that the way the train came? 
MR. THOMPSON: That is the way the train apparently 
came although the case is not clear about that. The court 
does say there that well, let me cite that. According to 
defendant, the Interstate Commerce Commission, not the FRA, 
required the mechanism as installed in 1941, the gear still 
left a 10 inch walkway clearance required by the IC regs and 
the location of the mechanism was selected by qualified 
personnel of defendant and had passed Interstate Commerce 
Commission inspections." Now in this case, these locomotives 
were built in Australia by a subsidiary of (inaudible) Motor 
Division of General Motors by Hammersly and were sold to an 
Australian incident and it is probable, although we don't 
know for sure that they were installed in Australia at the 
time. In other words, they are an after market bolt in type 
of device but they were installed after construction. At 
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least that's what I understand from defendant's interrogatory 
answers in this case that I have attached. 
THE COURT: It appears under this - is it Delevie? 
MR. THOMPSON: Delevie. 
THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference whether 
it's after market. 
MR. THOMPSON: I don't think so. I don't think so. 
Absolutely not because remember, this is a statute that is 
not a negligence statute. It doesn't matter whether the unit 
was safe the day before and the day after, it doesn't matter 
whether it functioned 10 minute beforehand and 10 minutes 
later, the LIA imposes upon the railroad the extraordinary 
duty to make sure that its locomotive is safe at all times 
when the locomotive is in use. The way the railroad can 
avoid liability is to take the locomotive out of service or 
insure, insure that its locomotive is safe and in proper 
condition to operate. That's the burden that the Locomotive 
Inspection Act places. It makes no difference whether it's 
after market or not. Once it's installed on the locomotive 
it is an appurtenance and therefore the railroad has the duty 
to make sure that it is safe to be used in service. 
THE COURT: That's the question that the jury has 
to decide. 
MR. THOMPSON: It certainly is, absolutely. I 
completely concur. 
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This is what the court said in Delevie. "The 
physical setup which resulted was one which the jury found to 
j be unsafe. In other words, a locomotive, no single part of 
which is installed or maintained in violation of the Boiler 
Inspection Act may still provide an unsafe place to work and 
so violate the act." That's Delevie at 497. Delevie is 
still good law. 
So, and I would refer to you as well the cases that 
are cited in my brief which are Lewisville vs. Botes, a 1949 
Eighth Circuit case and Bollen vs. Lehi Valley, a 1948 Second 
Circuit case. Both of those cases hold as well, Your Honor, 
that there is no need to prove a violation of a particular 
FRA regulation to invoke liability under the act because the 
railroad has the twin duties of both meeting all the minimum 
standards of the Federal (inaudible) Administration on 
locomotive safety and the higher duty under the Locomotive 
Inspection Act of insuring that the locomotive is safe and in 
proper conditions at all times it is intended to be used on 
the line. All right. 
All right. Counsel mentioned the fact of the 407 
issue and subsequently the measures and evidence that I put 
in. Although the Court hasn't read the briefs yet and I 
understand, let me take two minutes to layout the factual 
precedence for that. In its brief defendant took the 
position that the Locomotive Inspection Act is not violated 
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when "the condition has been in place for years without 
incident or reports of injury." That's directly from 
defendant's memorandum in support at Page 12. Whether or not 
that's the law - and I suggest to you in my brief that it is 
not, that is a factual mistake. We'd introduced evidence to 
show because the railroad had directly made that an issue in 
this case by saying that (inaudible) essentially that this 
condition had been in place for years and had not been a 
problem. The following, all we know is that these units were 
manufactured in Australia and were there for approximately 12 
years. What their history in Australia was in terms of 
injury with these, we have no idea and it's not in the 
record. All we do know is that in Australia they weren't 
subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act. When they came 
here they were acquired by the railroad in approximately May 
of 2001 and were put into service sometime between June 30 
and July 14th of 2001. Plaintiff was then injured on this 
locomotive as a result in whole or in part of this position, 
10 months later. We then know that on February 4, 2004, 
approximately 19 months later, one of the plaintiff 
coworkers, Steven Duane Clifton, another conductor employed 
by defendant struck his head and felt pain in his neck as a 
result of striking his head in the same fashion inside a 6000 
class locomotive and the record shows that all of these five 
6000 class locomotives are identical in terms of their inside 
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proportions with their unit inside. 
What we know is also from Mr. Bladuct who is r.he 
person who is specifically in charge of maintenance for Utah 
Railway by his own testimony, that in response to a direction 
from Genesis in Wyoming, Utah Railways parent corporation all 
of the units were then removed approximately two weeks later. 
Defendant then came back in its reply brief and said to us 
that those are subsequent remedial measures and can't be 
considered. Well, first of all, they opened the door, they 
made that an issue because they took the position that there 
was a history of no defects or no problems for years and 
years and years with this particular unit and that's not 
true. 407 allows impeachment and the rule in 407 — 
THE COURT: Well, where's there evidence that there 
was problems before Mr. Raab? 
MR. THOMPSON: There is no evidence but that's not 
the point. The subsequent remedial measures, it is 
admissible to prove that their statement to you that this had 
been in place for years and years without problems or reports 
is not accurate and — 
THE COURT: How is that established that's in the 
record? 
MR. THOMPSON: Because, in fact, Mr. Raab hurt 
himself. Mr. Clifton hurt himself, and then the railroad 
removed this condition in response to Mr. Clifton's injury as 
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they have indicated in their papers. 
THE COURT: It seems to me what I hear them saying 
is that we didn't have any problems, we had a problem with 
Raab, we didn't do anything/ but then we had a second problem 
and we decided well maybe there is a problem here so we take 
them out. 
MR. THOMPSON: Right. And that -
THE COURT: And that's not a remedial measure? 
MR. THOMPSON: It would be a remedial measure if it 
was introduced for the purpose of demonstrating culpability 
but 407 goes on, although defendant didn't cite it in their 
brief, it goes on to say that for other purposes, narrower 
purposes, there are exceptions to 407 which will allow that 
same evidence in and one of those exceptions is impeachment 
and this relevant to that issue. 
THE COURT: I guess I'm missing how that's relevant 
for impeachment purposes. 
MR. THOMPSON: Well, if you're going to consider 
their factual legal argument to you that somehow the absence 
of complaints or reports demonstrates that somehow there is a 
lack of problem and therefore there is no proof (inaudible) a 
violation then you need to know that in fact that 
representation to you is not true. 
THE COURT: I guess I'm missing the boat here but 
what I hear you saying is, is that we can impeach their 
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statement that there were no problems prior to Mr. Raab by 
the fact that they removed them after Mr. Raab and another 
man that was injured. Somehow that establishes that there 
were problems beforehand. How does that do that? 
MR. THOMPSON: No, and here's the problem, Your 
Honor, you're - with all due respect, I think this is the 
misconception, there is nothing in any of this evidence about 
prior to Raab. The representation is that there was nothing 
wrong with these units because there was never a problem, 
they had been in place for years. My evidence is simply 
saying it doesn't matter prior or past, it doesn't matter 
before or after for the simple purpose of impeaching their 
statement that there were no problems with these units 
whatsoever, that is not true. There were two problems and in 
fact as a result of those problems this company's parent 
ordered that those units be removed. 
THE COURT: So you're saying that statement that 
they've never been a problem? 
MR. THOMPSON: Right. 
THE COURT: Period. 
MR. THOMPSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: This statement is made sometime after 
the second incident. 
MR. THOMPSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Therefore it makes it... 
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MR. THOMPSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. THOMPSON: There are a number of exceptions to 
407 that are applicable here. Although it is apparently not 
the law of Utah and I do not find a federal case on point, 
there are some authorities and there is an Oregon case called 
Vancott vs. PGE that basically says that if the subsequent 
remedial measures are taken in response, not to plaintiff's 
injury, but to someone else's injury, the policy 
considerations that support subsequent remedial measure 407 
exclusion no long exist because the policy (inaudible) 407 is 
to encourage people to make repairs before someone else is 
injured again and the law wants to, of course, emphasize that 
but if the repair is actually made not in response to Raab's 
injury but it's made in response to Clifton's injury, 19 
months later, then the policy implications behind that 
evaporate and therefore there's no reason to enforce the 
subsequent remedial measure. I don't have the citation. It 
appears not to be the law of Utah. It's not that it's been 
denied but I see nothing in that and the law in Utah on this 
subject is pretty sparse but I would suggest to you that that 
is another rational reason to invoke the exceptions of the 
407. 
In addition, 407 exceptions are for parties. In 
other words, there are a number of cases and I will give you 
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those citations in just a minute that say that if the 
remedial measure is actually made by a non-party - by a third 
3 I party, that 407 does not come into play whatsoever and the 
4 i record here is that Utah Railway didn't take out these air 
5 j conditioning units, Genesis in Wyoming, its parent ordered 
6 | that in response to Mr. Clifton's injury. That is in 
7 \ attachment to Mr. Bladuct's deposition and it is also at 
8 I Exhibit 6 to Mr. Bladuct's deposition. There is a work order 
9 there that says the following, ''Remarks. Upon G&W's request, 
10 removed air conditioner from cab following a safety complaint 
11 from crew members." That was on 6062, February 2004 and I'll 
12 represent to you that Mr. Bladuct in his deposition testified 
13 that G&W means Genesis in Wyoming. He testified that the G&W 
14 is the parent corporation of the Utah Railway and that he was 
15 ordered to do that by Jim Davis who is the Chief Executive 
16 Officer of the parent. He is also the Chief Executive 
17 j Officer and President of the Utah Railway. We'll definitely 
18 make you aware of that right now. So he wears both hats but 
19 the request was from, in fact, Mr. Davis wearing his G&W hat 
20 | according to the factual record in this case. 
21 Sor let me get to the cases that support those. 
22 Here we are. The case, Your Honor - and Irm not sure the 
23 | pronunciation is Mehojah M-E-H-O-J-A-H vs. Drummond. It is 
24 I the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals out of Oklahoma, a 1995 
25 case. The citation is 56 Fed Third 1213 and in that case the 
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1 ! Court held "Rule 407 only applies to a defendant's voluntary j 
2 j actions. It is not applied to subsequent remedial measures 
3 I by non-defendants." It cites a host of federal cases from 
the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit 
and that's at Page 215. 
So we have at least three exceptions to Rule 407 so 
far in this case. But by far the most significant, Your 
Honor, is the issue of feasibility. Again, 407 specifically 
says that for narrower purposes including ownership, control, 
feasibility and impeachment, 407 evidence may be received. 
Defendant in its brief cited the Utah case of Schreiter 
S-C-H-R-E-I-T-E-R vs. Wasatch Manor, Incorporated. That was 
a Court of Appeals case from 1994. It's citation is 871 P 
Second 570. I have all these cases and I'm happy to leave 
them with the Court if the Court would like that. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. THOMPSON: In Schreiter, plaintiff was injured 
while living in a boarding house when another resident at the 
boarding house fell asleep while smoking in bed and caused a 
major fire which caused her smoke inhalation injuries. She 
sued defendant, the Manor House, claiming that they were 
negligent failing to supply the Manor House with a fire 
sprinkler suppression system in a timely fashion. The Manor 
House was built at the point in time when the code 
applications at the time did not require such. There was an 
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issue about whether or not the sprinkler system was feasible 
in the sense that it could have been put in and the plaintiff 
sought to call the Manor House superintendent who would have 
testified as to the cost of the installation as being a 
feasible alternative that the defendant should have taken. 
The trial court excluded that evidence and the Court reversed 
saying the following, "Whether something is feasible relates 
not only to physical possibility, cost and convenience but 
also to ultimate utility and success in attended 
performance." They cite a number of federal cases including 
Anderson vs. Maloey and American Airlines Incorporation which 
I'll talk about in a minute. I beg your pardon, I moved too 
far. I beg your pardon. I'm citing the next case that it 
relies on. Please pardon me. 
Again, they say that basically beginning at Page 
573 of the Utah Appellate report, "While Schreiter argues 
that the bid evidence is admissible to show feasibility of 
installing such a system, the trial court found that it was 
not within the feasibility exception to rule. According to 
the Court feasibility exemption applies only if there is an 
issue as to whether or not the fire sprinkling systems 
physically can be installed; however, neither the trial court 
nor Wasatch Manor cites any authority for such a narrow 
interpretation of Rule 407. 
In fact, the fifth Circuit has noted just the 
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opposite interpreting federal rule of evidence 407 of which 
the Utah rule is an exact copy. See Reese vs. Mercury Marine 
Division of Burnswick Corporation, a Fifth Circuit Court case 
from 1986 out of Texas" which I also have a copy for you 
which holds the same. According to the Reese court, "Whether 
something is feasible relates not only to physical 
possibility, cost and convenience but also to ultimate 
utility and success in intended performance." 
THE COURT: Well, this isn't a feasibility issue is 
it? 
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, because what they're saying to 
is we let these units stay in, they were just great, nothing 
was ever wrong and we don't know what Mr. Raab is talking 
about. They're just peachy keen. If feasibility means 
ultimate utility and success in intended performance which 
the Utah Court of Appeals says it does here in this state, 
I'm entitled to show that in fact they removed those units 
because their installation and continued position in those 
units was not ultimate utility and success in their intended 
performance. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. THOMPSON: In accord with that, Your Honor I 
would highly recommend to you the 1969 case of American 
Airlines Incorporated vs. United States which is also titled 
Creasey vs. United States. It is a Sixth Circuit case. It is 
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at 418 Fed Second 1(e). American Airlines - the facts are 
these. There was an airplane crash of a 727 in the 
Cincinnati airport in 1965 that killed 48 out of 52 
passengers on board. The crash occurred because the pilot 
was flying in inclement weather at an elevation that was 200 
feet below the mean elevation of the Cincinnati airport. 
Evidence deduced that he was flying with a particular 
altimeter drum that was faulty or at there's allegations that 
it was faulty. in that particular case, American Airlines 
took the position that there was nothing wrong with the 
altimeter drum and that it was safe to be utilized, yet they 
replaced all of the altimeter drums in every 727 in their 
fleet after that incident. The Court there ruled that 
because the defendant had, one, told the jury that in fact 
that these things were great, there was entitlement to 
impeach them because they had, in fact, made a change 
subsequent to that and that was impeachment testimony or the 
prior testimony about safety, about the utility of these 
devices. 
And secondly, because they put safety versus you 
know, a lack of safety. They made it an issue by, the 
defendants made it an issue by putting that into evidence and 
so plaintiffs were entitled to show by the subsequent 
remedial measure that that in fact was not true and that 
these were replaced. Same issues are here. The Court simply 
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says very briefly, "On two occasions evidence precautions 
taken by the defendants since the accident were admitted. Of 
course, the general rule is that such evidence is not 
admissible to prove antecedent negligence; however, use of 
such evidence for rebuttal or impeachment is permitted." I'm 
citing Tyler v. Dowel Incorporated, Tenth Circuit 1960, 274 
Fed Second 890 cert (inaudible) United State Supreme Court 
363 US812, 1960. 
In essence, Your Honor, I'm suggesting to you that 
there are four, perhaps five exceptions that will allow all 
of that evidence here to be considered by you in connection 
with deciding this motion and it clearly shows that, in fact, 
there was a defect in the locomotive by the placement or 
position of the air conditioning unit as evidenced by the 
fact that the defendants parent company removed them after 
the incident. You're entitled to consider that on the basis 
of all of these exceptions in terms of finding whether or not 
there was a defect that is cognizable under the LIA. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. THOMPSON: I've talked a long time. I thank 
you for your patience, Your Honor. I'd ask that you deny 
both motions. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. McGarvey, anything you want 
to say? 
MR. MCGARVEY: Yes, Your Honor. There's been a lot 
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of things said I'd like to address. I'll kind of go 
backwards. Let's talk first about 407. We need to remember 
that what we're talking about here is, is there a liability 
here for violation of the safety statute? Keeping that in 
mind, going over these various things that Mr. Thompson just 
talked about, feasibility first of all. 407 deals with 
feasibility of doing the act, the subsequent remedial 
measure. That's what it addresses. If a party takes the 
position that the act, in this case removing air conditioners 
couldn't be done, then evidence of removing air conditioners 
could come in to prove that it's possible, feasible to 
remover air conditioners. The other cases that Mr. Thompson 
cited regarding intended performance or utility of device, 
that is a completely different situation. That has nothing 
to do with this case. If this case were about whether the 
air conditioners functioned as air conditioners, had utility 
as an air conditioner, that was their intended purpose and we 
took the position that they did and if that were an issue -
which it's not - if that were an issue and then we took them 
out, then they could present that as evidence to say, well, 
they really didn't work as air conditioners because you took 
them out but that is not an issue in this case and it 
certainly is not an issue with respect to whether the safety 
statute is violated because of the mere existence of the air 
conditioners. So feasibility argument is off point, it has 
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nothing to do with these issues and for purposes of the third 
party, mode of power taking them out, Utah Railway doesn't do 
that work. It doesn't do the mechanical work, it hires it 
done. That doesn't mean it didn't have the work done. The 
time period argument made by Mr. Thompson, the evidence will 
be that the air conditioners were taken out because as Your 
Honor knows, there was one and then finally another incident 
and the company finally said, well, you know, let's take them 
out. Let's don't let there be any issue. 
THE COURT: He's not saying that the workman who 
removed it has something to do with it. He's saying the 
third party is the party who directed your client to do it? 
MR. MCGARVEY: Oh no. If that's what he's saying, 
he's absolutely wrong. Genesis in Wyoming is the parent 
company. It is Utah Railway, it directs Utah Railway. It is 
the entity then who, for purposes of paperwork and that sort 
of thing, has the contract with Motor Power and those sorts 
of things. The decision was made by Mr. Davis as Mr. Bladuct 
testified in his deposition who is the local President of 
Utah Railway who made that decision and the air conditioners 
were then taken out by the company, the parent company, 
Genesis in Wyoming contracts to have that work done by. So 
for all of those reasons it doesn't come in but most 
importantly it doesn't come in because the issue here is, is 
25 j that evidence relevant for purposes of culpability? It is 
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relevant for purposes of showing that their mere existence is 
a violation of the safety statute and our point simply is, 
no, that subsequent remedial measure of taking air 
conditioners out, that fact that they were taken out does not 
make it more probable or likely that the statute was violated 
as opposed to wasn't violated. If anything, if it comes in 
at all which we don't think it does, it comes in on the issue 
that we're not here addressing of negligence. Would a 
reasonable man have taken them out sooner or later or what 
would a reasonable man have done? That's what it would go to 
if anything but that is not the issue not before the Court 
and that particular evidence certainly doesn't prove that 
there was a safety violation. 
Also, with respect to the Locomotive Inspection Act 
issue Mr. Thompson talked about the Delevie case and I want 
to just clarify what that case stood for. In that case, 
reading from it on Page 497 Mr. Thompson gave you the full 
cite, we read, "The jury also found, however, that a power 
reverse gear mechanism installed horizontally above the metal 
footwork made access to the cab unsafe and that the location 
of the mechanism was a cause of the subject." It then went 
on to describe what was meant by that. It says, "The power 
mechanism may have interfered with Delevie in reaching for 
the handrail as he mounted the steps to the footwalk and so 
throws him off balance as he reached that stage of his 
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progress toward the cab. To this we might add the distinct 
possibility that the reverse gear, being situated only a foot 
above the footwalk and cutting off more than half of the 
walk, might well have made it particularly difficult for a 
275 pound man like Delevie to maintain a secure grip on the 
top portion of the handrail which too followed the preceding 
curvature of the engine." 
In that particular case the Court was looking at 
did that gear box where it was located, although not a 
violation of any regulation, did it make the locomotive as 
the statute provides "unsafe to operate" and because Mr. 
Delevie couldn't grab the handrail and couldn't make use of 
safety devices on the locomotive in order to get into the 
cab, that was the basis for the Delevie court 
issue. Then comparing that now to the facts before 
this Court, the air conditioning unit didn't prevent Mr. Raab 
from reaching any safety devices or from doing anything or 
from being able to safely get into the cab. He just merely 
needed to walk into the cab and keep his bent down perhaps 
another step more than he did rather than putting it up and 
hitting it on the air conditioner. The Delevie court did not 
involve an injury where Mr. Delevie hit himself against that 
object because it existed. It caused a problem. 
Lilly also as the Court I think understands but 
just to highlight, again, addressed the issue of unsafe to 
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operate, not unsafe. Tenders are unsafe. Employees can fall 
off the tender. Locomotives aren't safe. Employees can hit 
their heads, bang their knees, fall off, do all sorts of 
different things on a locomotive. The issue is, was the 
tender unsafe to operate and the court found that it was the 
existence of ice that made it unsafe to operate as a tender 
because of the existence of that foreign material. The case 
of Raab, there is no foreign material. There was an air 
conditioner that operated as it was intended, it was safe to 
operate as an air conditioner and for those reasons, Your 
Honor, the Locomotive Inspection Act is not held applicable 
by those cases and we will refer you to the cases cited in 
the briefs you will have an opportunity to read, the multiple 
cases that talk about simply being injured on a locomotive 
isn't a basis for a violation of the Safety Act or of any 
regulation. There has to be more. There has to be some 
defect and the mere existence of a locomotive and its parts 
isn't a defect. 
Moving on then to the 506 dynamic brake issue. Let 
start at the beginning on this one instead of working 
backwards. Rogers has been cited so many times because of 
the conflict it has engendered in case law. The Supreme 
Court in Sorrel acknowledged in the concurring opinion 
particularly that there was a conflict among the circuits and 
that that issue will have to addressed although it wasn't 
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squarely before them at that time. Those three occurring 
justices expressed their views on it and clearly pointed out 
what Rogers meant. The reason is perhaps going even further 
back in time is that FELA statute is indeed a radical change. 
It was enacted in the late 1800s. At that time contributory 
negligence was a complete bar. Proximate cause in some cases 
as in Missouri as we saw, meant that there had to be sole 
cause as a component. It was an extremely radical idea for 
congress at that time to say that an employer could have some 
negligence apart, in whole or in part and still be held 
liable, or the plaintiff was liable, perhaps the employee was 
99 percent liable and yet the railroad would be responsible. 
That was a huge change in the law and all Rogers was 
addressing was that huge change when it said even the 
slightest which only means the railroad is one percent at 
fault instead of not the sole cause. Then the railroad could 
be liable but only for that one percent of its fault. That's 
the departure, that's all that's meant by slight. There are 
cases that have misconstrued that, not United State Supreme 
Court cases, lower court cases and some have gone so far as 
to say that meets slight negligence or even slight causation 
which as I was trying to say before and submit, makes no 
sense. Does that mean almost negligence? I mean, there's no 
definition for slight negligence. There's no way to apply 
it. Kind of causation but not really cause? I mean of 
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course not. It's negligence under the absolute standard that 
we all understand, failure of a reasonable man to act. under 
the circumstances as a reasonable man would. I messed it up 
but you know what I mean. Causation is the same as well. 
The statute was merely saying that if it's one percent in 
6 j part then that's sufficient. So Sorrel makes that very clear 
7 | that that's all Rogers and all those other cases that go off 
on those tangents, I warn the Court to be cautious about that 
as you look at the cases submitted and by the briefs in this 
10 | particular case. So there's no dispute that if the railroad 
i 
11 | ' is one percent at fault with respect to the dynamic brake 
12 
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14 
15 
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18 
this motion fails the plaintiff is allowed to proceed. Our 
position simply is it cannot even be one percent fault 
because it's simply too far removed. 
The 507 locomotive, just to make sure the facts are 
clear in your mind, was set out. It was taken out of the 
unit and set aside. Mr. Raab has submitted that Booth, the 
engineer, will testify in this case and will say that it had 
19 | completely been set out and was no longer part of the train. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Mr. Raab wasn't going to set it out, he wasn't returning from 
setting it out, he wasn't going to repair the dynamic brake, 
he wasn't returning from repairing the dynamic brake. He was 
doing the job he was hired to do of making sure that this 
train that he was taking over the summit was in proper 
condition, aligned, coupled, the knobs were in the correct 
56 
65 
positions they needed to be in order for the train to begin 
movement down the hill into Provo. He was doing a job that 
he would have done regardless and wherever that train would 
have been and regardless of what circumstances lead him to 
have to make sure the train was ready to go. If he were to 
pick up a train in Provo, he would have to go through the 
units and make sure that they were set and aligned and knobs 
were where they needed to be and make sure the train was 
ready to go. 
In fact, there's evidence in the reply brief 
submitted to you that Mr. Raab was a conductor on units in 
May, this very month, the accident occurred May 31, on at 
least I think seven7 occasions he had worked on units that 
had at least two 6000 series units in them. He knew what 
these units were, he was familiar with these units and he 
could have bumped his head at any of those times under any 
circumstances and he could have not bumped his head at this 
time just like he avoided it on all prior occasions. 
Mr. Thompson talked about Wilson. Wilson is after 
Rogers. In fact Mr. Thompson affirmatively states as follows 
in Rogers and when he said that he means the way that many 
courts have misconstrued and followed Rogers. In that 
particular case, however, the plaintiff was injured while 
returning from actually repairing the defect. He never would 
have had to be where he was had there not been a defect. 
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1 j Raab was not injured while going to or from as we talked 
2 j about. 
3 The Juno case, plaintiff was pushing a bar to fix a 
4 J defective coupler when the bar slipped and he fell. Raab was 
5 not doing anything to fix the dynamic brakes at the time. He 
6 J was simply having to enter into a 6000 series locomotive. 
7 Mr. Thompson says that he's stunned that we didn't 
8 cite Rogers. Again, the issue in Rogers of one percent 
9 versus sole cause isn't an issue. At issue is whether there 
10 is any cause at all and we submit that there isn't and 
11 there's no need to discuss whether 1 or 100 percent is 
12 required. The point is, there's no causation because it's 
13 too far removed. Rogers simply was not material. Davis had 
14 not been overruled. That's a United States Supreme Court 
15 | Case. Rogers, in fact, relies on Davis and cites it when it 
16 | explains that all it was doing was setting the standard that 
17 j had always been the standard, was doing nothing new. Rogers 
18 I court didn't think it was doing anything new at all by citing 
19 Davis and all those prior cases. All it thought it was doing 
20 was saying no, the defendant doesn't have to be 100 percent. 
21 That's all it was saying and that, of course, clearly had 
22 been law as stated in Davis and in multiple prior Supreme 
23 I Court cases. 
24 ! So Lang and Reese and all those cases that 
25 understood and properly applied that law as stated in Rogers 
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I believe the answer to the question is in some of 
the cases that have been cited by the parties and I note that 
the Rogers case does talk about whether the proof justifies 
the conclusion that the employer negligence played any part, 
even the slightest in producing the injury for which the 
damages are sought. And it goes on to say that the 
conclusion may be drawn that the negligence of the employer 
played any part at all in the injury or death, that's the 
inquiry. The judges are to fix their sights primarily to 
make that appraisal and if that test is made, are bound to 
find a case where the jury is made up. So the test is has 
that single inquiry been met? 
What we have in this particular case - and I think 
the critical thing about this particular case is has the 
issue with 506 or 5006 been resolved or not? I think the 
facts, undisputed facts are that that engine had been 
removed, it was set aside, there was nothing left to do with 
that engine when Mr. Raab was injured. He left that engine. 
He'd gone to the new consist and was checking it out to see 
whether or not it was in appropriate condition to move down 
the hill. 
This is nor the Wilson case because this is not 
repairing or going to or from the repair like that case was. 
Everything had been finished. If it had been finished 12 
hours before or 10 minutes before, it is still finished and I 
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believe there is no connection between the dynamic brake 
issue and the injury that Mr. Raab suffered when he was 
connecting up the new consist. I don't believe that there's 
any negligence between the two, there's no connection. I 
just don't accept that argument. Everything was finished 
with the 5006, it was set aside. 
Now what we have is Mr. Raab doing a new duty and 
that is the duty of preparing this new consist to make sure 
it's in order before it goes down the hill. So the 
connection with the train at issue, 5006, is over with, we're 
onto a new duty and there's no connection between those two 
12 i as far as the negligence of the railway. So I will grant the 
Motion for Summary Judgment that the dynamic brake issue is 
not relevant to this case and I will give you my decision on 
the issue concerning the air conditioning unit after I review 
the briefs that we have. If you'd like to give me those 
cases that you cited, Mr. Thompson, on those issues, I'd be 
happy to look at them as well. 
MR. THOMPSON: Would Your Honor like to have them 
now or may I mail them to you? 
THE COURT: Whichever is more convenient for you. 
MR. THOMPSON: I'd like to mail them if that's 
okay. 
THE COURT: Very well, okay. Just let the other 
side know which ones you sent me. You don't have to send 
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them copies. 
MR. THOMPSON: I'm going to carbon copy them as 
well so there's no issue. 
THE COURT: Just tell them the name of the cases, I 
think that's probably sufficient but if you want to send them 
that's also okay. Then I will review this. There are two 
memos in this file that were filed, one on the 3ra of 
December according to the filing here which is Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition of the Federal Locomotive Inspection 
Act and the Defendant's Replay Memorandum on the Violation of 
the Act. It seems to me there ought to be another memo in 
here someplace. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Your Honor, it may help, we 
submitted last week and apparently something happened but we 
submitted two binders. One of the binders contained the 
initial motion memorandum, the opposition and the reply. So 
apparently that binder has been — 
THE COURT: I haven't gotten any binders. 
MR. MCGARVEY: - misdelivered or something. 
THE COURT: This is the only one I have and I see 
down that there was another memo filed. We have them all but 
like I said, gentlemen, I guess I have to accept some 
responsibility, I should have looked at the docket to make 
sure everything was here but I just assumed that when I 
looked at this file that everything was in it. 
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MR. MCGARVEY: It's my responsibility. I'm happy 
to prepare another binder if that would be convenient. 
THE COURT: Maybe we ought to just have them check 
downstairs to see if that binder shows up before you do it 
because they're in this file now, I can look in this file and 
see it. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Your Honor, would you like me to 
prepare an order for the (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: Yes, please prepare an order on it. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Would you like me to include then 
the denial of the discovery motions? 
THE COURT: Yes, they're moot. 
MR. MCGARVEY: Mooted. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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Respondent, Utah Railway Company ("URC"), hereby files its opposition in 
answer to the Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutor)' Order filed by Petitioner, 
Scott Raab. Mr. Raab has expressed an intent to file a second petition for an appeal of 
another interlocutory order. To avoid any confusion, this answer addresses Mr. Raab's 
first petition that pertains to his claim that an alleged defective dynamic brake on 
locomotive unit 5006 caused his injury when he later stood up too soon in the cab of a 
completely different, stationary locomotive that was not even coupled to the 5006 unit, 
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and allegedly bumped his head. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The train on which the Petitioner, Scott Raab, was working on May 31. 2002 was a 
freight train that was made up of loaded coal cars. A consist (or group) of four 
locomotives was pulling that train. It also had five or six helper units that were coupled 
in the middle of the train. The helper units assisted the train's ascent from Helper. Utah 
to the top of Soldier Summit, where those helper units were uncoupled from the train and 
returned to Helper. The conductor. Mr. Raab, and the engineer were the only two crew 
members operating that freight train. They were both on the lead locomotive. 
Inasmuch as the engineer is required to remain in control of the train from the cab 
of the lead locomotive, it was Mr. Raab's responsibility, as the conductor, to leave the 
lead locomotive to do anything else that needed to be done. On May 31, 2002, Mr. Raab 
in fact was involved in the switching of locomotives at Soldier Summit, including 
switching to free the helper units so they could return to Helper before the train proceeded 
in the other direction to Provo. He assisted by being on the ground to do the uncoupling 
and coupling that was necessary to free the helper units. Mi'. Raab testified that he also 
went into many of the other locomotives while assisting with the moving of the 
locomotives at Soldier Summit. The 5006 unit was removed from the consist because the 
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engineer thought it had a problem with its dynamic brakes.1 Mr. Raab did not know if the 
5006 unit was left at Soldier Summit or went back to Helper with the helper units. 
On May 31, 2002, after the train had been coupled without the helper units and the 
5006 unit, Mr. Raab was performing his expected duties of going into the trailing 
locomotive units of the consist of locomotives that had been coupled together at the head 
end, in order to make sure the controls were properly positioned. This was necessary to 
enable the engineer to control those locomotives from the cab of the leading unit. It was 
while Mr. Raab was performing this task, although it could have been while doing any 
number of tasks that would have required him to be in a trailing unit, that he stood up too 
soon after entering through the cab door. By standing up before he had moved from 
beneath the doorway and an air conditioning unit installed on the ceiling just inside the 
doorway of a 6000 series locomotive, he bumped his head on the bottom of that air 
conditioner. Mr. Raab could have bumped his head on the air conditioner in that unit or 
any other such 6000 series unit, or he could have bumped his head while going through 
the doorway itself or at other locations within the cab where the available headroom was 
lower than his height, at any other time while performing any number of other job duties 
that would have required him to go into such locomotives. 
lThis later proved out to be untrue or at least unlikely since a subsequent 
inspection revealed no problem with these brakes. 
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Mr. Raab stood up and bumped his head while the train was stopped, not while it 
was braking or stopping. Moreover, at the time he bumped his head, the 5006 unit with 
the alleged defective dynamic brake was not even coupled to the train; it had been set out 
(detached from the rest of the train), and could not. through any malfunctioning brake, 
have caused plaintiff to stand up when he did before moving out from beneath the air 
conditioner. 
It should be understood that locomotive cabs, by their very nature, are confined in 
the amount of available headroom. The doorways require almost all employees to bend 
over, or w4duck,*' while entering. Mr. Raab testified that he always ducked when going 
through any locomotive cab door. He is over six feet tall. Even inside locomotive cabs, 
there are various places where virtually all employees cannot stand fully erect. In the 
6000 series locomotives the height of the cab door and other places within the cab range 
in height from 5*1.5*' to 5"" 8". The lavatory has only 5* 10.75*' of clearance. At those 
locations the clearance is less than the 5*11** of clearance beneath the air conditioners 
installed in the 6000 series locomotives. 
Mr. Raab's factual theory on causation is not that an alleged defective dynamic 
brake on unit 5006 caused him to move unexpectedly or suddenly so as to bump his head. 
His theory on causation is that the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006 resulted 
in at least a part reason for his performance of his usual and ordinary duties during the 
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performance of which he injured himself by standing erect sooner than he should have, 
bumping his head in a different locomotive. Mr. Raab seeks to blame his employer for an 
alleged condition that caused him in part to have to do work. The district court below 
properly dismissed all claims predicated on the alleged defective dynamic brake on the 
detached 5006 unit, thereby allowing the case to proceed as to the alleged negligence 
pertaining to the existing air conditioner in the 6000 series locomotive in which he was 
working, and to Mr. Raab's own negligence in standing fully erect too soon while still 
beneath the air conditioner. 
RESPONSE TO STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In addition to stating the standard of appellate review, Mi*. Raab also states what 
he contends to be the law applicable to actions brought under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act ("FELA"). Mr. Raab's statement is misleading, and, therefore, it is 
necessary to clearly summarize what the FELA provides. 
Negligence actions under the FELA are similar to common law negligence actions 
in that both provide for trial by jury, unless waived. Likewise, both types of negligence 
actions require evidence. In fact both require the same standard of evidence sufficient 
for the plaintiff to prove all the usual elements of a negligence action by a 
"preponderance of the evidence." and not any lesser burden of proof. Finally, FELA and 
state law negligence actions differ only in that, under the FELA. the contributorily 
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negligent plaintiff can recover even if the railroad employer was as little as 1% negligent; 
whereas, under Utah law, the plaintiff has to prove negligence by tortfeasors greater than 
the negligence of himself or herself. However, railroad tortfeasors, as with common law 
tortfeasors in Utah, are liable only to the extent of their proportionate share of negligence, 
unless there is a violation of a safety statute. In that case, the railroad plaintiffs 
contributory negligence cannot be considered and the violation is deemed to be per se 
negligence.2 Despite this difference in recovery being contingent upon the percentage of 
negligence attributed to the defendant, or the violation of a safety statute which is deemed 
to be per se negligence without any contributory negligence of the employee, there is no 
difference in the legal standard of what constitutes negligence or ''proximate causation" 
as elements of the negligence action. The law pertaining to causation in FELA actions is 
the same as in state law negligence actions, and is addressed farther in the discussion 
below. 
NO APPEAL IS WARRANTED AND 
NO IMMEDIATE APPEAL IS NECESSARY 
I. Mr. Raab Has No Legal Basis To Overturn The District Court's Ruling. 
The district court was correct in its ruling. It is Mi*. Raab who is in error. As a 
2Mr Raab claims the alleged defective dynamic brake is a violation of a safety 
statute, relieving him of having to pro\ e actual negligence and of the consequences of his 
own nesliaence. 
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matter of law, the alleged defective brake on the detached, stationary 5006 locomotive 
cannot be the legal cause of Mr. Raab bumping his head in a different, stationary 
locomotive, when he stood fully erect before he was out from beneath an air conditioner, 
during the performance of his duties. No case cited and discussed by Mr. Raab holds 
otherwise, including Christiansen v Union Pacific Railroad Co , 2006 UT App 180, 136 
P.3d 1266 and Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500 (1957). 
However, before responding to Mi*. Raab's discussion of what he contends to be 
controlling case law, it is necessary to first point out that summary judgment is properly 
(and necessarily) granted where the evidence is not sufficient to prove causation, and the 
causation standard that Mr. Raab must meet is the same in FELA cases as in Utah 
negligence cases - ''proximate cause." 
A. Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In FELA Cases Where There 
Is Insufficient Evidence To Create A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
As To Whether Causation Can Be Proven By A "Preponderance Of 
The Evidence." 
Mr. Raab begins by claiming that, in Utah, causation cannot be resolved as a 
matter of law. Of course, that proposition is absurd. Causation can be resoh ed as a 
matter of law if there is not sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Causation indeed has been resolved as a matter of law, and such 
detenninations have been upheld on appeal E g, Mountain West Surgical Center, LLC v. 
Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT 92. 173 P.3d 1276; Tnesault v Greater Salt Lake 
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Business Dist., 2005 UT App. 489, % 14, 126 P.3d 781, 785. 
Moreover, in FELA cases, as in other negligence cases, there must be sufficient 
evidence to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Per singer v. 
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990) ("To recover under the FELA, 
a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was 
negligent."); Denniston v. Burlington N.} Inc., 726 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirmed 
judgment for employer where jury was instructed that the plaintiff "was required to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the railroad knew or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known of the existence of the condition that rendered the place of work 
unsafe*5); Rose v. Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co., 277 F. Supp. 913, 918 (D. S.C. 1967) 
("Plaintiff must establish by the preponderance of the evidence that under the 
circumstance presented defendant failed to use due care"), hi Utah, there never has been 
any question that juries in FELA cases, which after all are civil cases, are given the 
traditional preponderance of the evidence instruction similar to what is found at MUJI 
2.18. 
B. An FELA Plaintiff Must Prove That The Railroad's Conduct Was A 
"Proximate Cause" Of The Plaintiffs Injury. 
Plaintiff concedes that legal causation requires evidence to prove the alleged 
cause, "in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injur}' and without which the result would not have occurred."' Petition, at 6. 
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While acknowledging these elements of causation, Mr. Raab further concedes the fact: 
(1) that the alleged defective dynamic brake was on unit 5006. not a 6000 series 
locomotive; (2) that unit 5006 was set out and no longer part of the train; (3) that the 
train, in any event, was stopped and not in need of braking through the application of any 
brakes; (4) that the new consist of locomotives had been coupled together and to the 
freight cars; (5) that as part of his normal duties before releasing the train for movement 
by the engineer, he went through the new consist to make sure they were ready to be 
controlled by the engineer; and (6) that while performing those duties of his employment 
he stood fully erect after bending over to enter the cab of a 6000 series locomotive and 
stood up too soon while still beneath an air conditioner that did not allow him sufficient 
headroom to do so. Thus, contends Mr. Raab, had the dynamic brake on unit 5006 not 
been defective, he may not have had to perform the additional duties of his employment 
during which he stood up too soon in a stationary 6000 series locomotive and bumped his 
head. 
Not only did the alleged defective dynamic brake fail to naturally and 
continuously, without any intervening cause, cause Mr. Raab to move in a maimer that he 
bumped his head. Mr. Raab could have bumped his head on the air conditioner at any 
other time and place by simply standing up too soon after bending over to enter through 
the door of the cab on any 6000 series locomotive. He could have bumped his head on 
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the low doorway or other places in the cab where the headroom was too low for him to 
stand fully erect, despite the reason for his entering or being in the locomotive cab. He 
could have bumped his head in the lead locomotive of the new consist or the prior consist. 
As a matter of law, there can be no legal causation between the alleged defective dynamic 
brake and Mi*. Raab's bumped head. 
The test for causation in FELA cases is exactly the same as the state law standard 
just discussed. FELA plaintiffs do have a lighter burden; they only need to show 1% 
employer negligence caused the injury at issue, not that the percentage of the defendant's 
negligence is greater than that of the plaintiff. However, there is no lighter burden for the 
evidentiary standard of preponderance of the evidence nor the legal standard of proximate 
cause as to that, at least. 1% negligence. This is where Mr. Raab erred below and 
continues to en* in his Petition. 
1. The United States Supreme Court Has Established That a 
Railroad May Only Be Liable Under the FELA If Its Conduct 
Was the Proximate Cause In Whole Or in Part Of the 
Employee's Injury. 
The FELA requires proof that the employer's negligence was a cause "in whole or 
in part" of the injury. 45 U.S.C. § 51. This merely means that traditional "contributory" 
negligence, that historically operated as a complete defense, and Utah's modified 
comparative negligence statute are not applicable. Rather, the FELA provides for pure 
comparative negligence so that if railroad negligence is proven to be a 1% ("part") cause 
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of the plaintiffs injury and resulting damage, the railroad is liable, but only for 1% of the 
plaintiffs damages. See also 45 U.S.C. § 53 ("the fact that the employee may have been 
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be 
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such 
employee"). Thus, at the time the FELA was enacted in the early 1900's, that statute was 
an extreme departure from tort law as it then existed. It may not seem so extreme today, 
in light of worker's compensation and various types of modified comparative negligence 
statutes, but it was then and it greatly liberalized when injured railroad employees could 
recover for on-the-job injuries. 
The Supreme Court has, since the inception of the FELA, held that the statutory 
causation rule is proximate cause: the plaintiff must prove that the railroad's "negligence 
was the proximate cause in whole or in part" of the employee's injury. Tennant v. Peoria 
& Peking Union Ry. Co.. 321 U.S. 29, 32 (1944) (citation omitted); see also Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 195 (1949) (recognizing proximate cause as the appropriate 
standard in FELA suits); Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 810 (2007) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (recognizing that Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company 
did not remove proximate cause from the FELA). Because the statute provides that a 
railroad may be liable if the employee's injur}' or death "resulted . . . in part from die 
[railroad's] negligence," 45 U.S.C. § 51, the jury may find the railroad liable even if there 
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were other causes of the employee's injury or death. However, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the requirement of proximate causation must still be met. The railroad's 
conduct must be either "the sole or a contributor)7 proximate cause/5 Coray v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 523 (1949). Accordingly, "cto warrant a finding that negligence . . 
. is the proximate cause of an injury it must appear that the injury was the natural and 
probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act. . ."' Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 
U.S. 476, 483 (1943). The Supreme Court has reiterated the federal proximate cause rule 
under the FELA in case after case.3 
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the federal proximate cause rule in Davis 
v Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239 (1923). In that case, which involved a FELA claim based upon 
the railroad's violation of the Safety Appliance Act, the Court held that <kan employee 
cannot recover5' if the railroad's unlawful conduct *'is not a proximate cause of the 
3
 See, e g., Lang v New York Cent. R.R., 255 U.S. 455, 461 (1921) (reversing for 
lack of evidence of proximate cause); St. Louis -San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mills, 271 U.S. 
344, 347 (1926 ) (same); Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bobo, 290 U.S. 499, 503 (1934) 
(same): see also, e.g. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. McWiirter, 229 U.S. 265, 280 
(1913): Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U.S. 147. 148 (1924); Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault St. 
Marie Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1926): New York Cent. R.R. v. Ambrose, 
280 U.S. 486, 489 (1930): Swinson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 294 
U.S. 529. 531 (1935): Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assn of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938); 
Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co, 318 U.S. 54, 67 (1943); Coray, 335 U.S. at 523 
(1949); Urie, 337 U.S. at 195; ODonnell v. Elgin Joliet & E Ry. Co . 338 U.S. 384, 390 
(1949). Carter v Atlantic & St Andrews Bay Ry Co . 338 U.S. 430. 434-35 (1949): 
Brown v Western Ry of Ala . 338 U.S 294.297-98(1949). 
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accident which results in his injury, but merely creates an incidental condition or situation 
in which the accident, otherwise caused, results in such injury/' Id. at 243 (emphasis 
added). On the other hand, the employee may recover if such employer conduct was aa 
proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his 
duty." Id. The United States Supreme Court has never changed this rule of law. 
Notwithstanding this overwhelming precedent, and the rule that the Supreme Court 
"does not normally overturn, or . . . dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio" 
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000), some lower 
courts have held that the Supreme Court silently overruled decades of its prior causation 
precedents in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500 (1957). See 
Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 809-810, at n.* (Souter, J. concurring) (discussing circuit 
conflict). Those rogue decisions cannot be followed for two reasons. First they are based 
on a patent misreading of Rogers. Second, and most fundamentally, the Supreme Court 
has held that it has exclusive prerogative to declare its own precedents overruled, and 
lower courts must continue to follow those prior precedents even if they believe them to 
be inconsistent with later Supreme Court decisions. Rodriguez de Quijas v 
Shear son/American Express, Inc . 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
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2. The Supreme Court's Decision in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Company did not Remove Proximate Causation from 
the FELA. 
Mr. Raab cited to Rogers for his underlying proposition that it is easier to prove 
employer liability under the FELA. This Court should not be confused by such a 
statement. Rogers merely rejected a particular state common law conception of 
"proximate cause55 that required a showing that the railroad's wrongful act was the "sole" 
cause of injury. 352 U.S. at 506. In other words, there would be no liability if the 
employee also proximately caused his/her injury to any degree (1%). That conception 
was contrary to both the plain language of the FELA and prior Supreme Court precedents 
on proximate cause, as set forth above. Rogers made clear that in circumstances where 
upon the evidence the jury could find either the employee's and the railroad's negligence 
or just the railroad's negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury, a prima facie case 
was established. As the Sorrell concurrence explained: "Despite some courts5 views to 
the contrary. Rogers did not address, much less alter, existing law governing the degree of 
causation necessary for redressing negligence as the cause of negligently inflicted harm; 
the case merely instructed courts how to proceed when there are multiple cognizable 
causes of an injury.55 127 S. Ct. 799, 809-810 (Souter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
In Rogers, the employee had been burning weeds on a sloping track bed. When a 
train passed, it fanned the flames of the fire he had created, and forced the employee to 
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back onto a culvert. The employee slipped on gravel and fell off the culvert, sustaining 
physical injuries. At trial, the employee adduced evidence that the railroad was negligent 
in requiring him to work near the tracks where passing trains could fan the flames around 
him, and in failing to maintain the surface of the culvert from which he slipped; the 
railroad countered with evidence that the employee was negligent in not watching his fire. 
352 U.S. at 502-04. The Court expressly stated that, on the evidence presented, the jury 
could have found either the employee or the railroad to have been the legal cause of the 
injury. Id. at 504. 
Even though the jury had found for the plaintiff, the Missouri Supreme Court had 
reversed the judgment, in part on the ground that the employee's "conduct was at least as 
probable a cause for his mishap as any negligence of the [railroad], and that in such case 
there was no case for the jury." Id. at 505. The state court had erroneously ruled that 
"there is no jury question in actions under this statute . . . unless the judge can say that the 
jury may exclude the idea that his injury was due to causes with which the defendant was 
not connected.'5 Id. at 505-06. The Supreme Court in Rogers disapproved the state 
court's decision, which improperly invoked "language of proxmiate causation which 
makes a jury question dependent upon whether the jury may find that the defendant's 
negligence was the sole, efficient, producing cause of injury. " Id. at 506 (emphasis 
added). A rule that the railroad's negligence must be the "sole" proximate cause of injury 
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is contrary to the statutory directive that renders a railroad liable if its negligence is a 
partial cause of the employee's injury. 45 U.S.C. § 51. Rather, where the evidence 
suggested multiple causes, the Supreme Court held that "[u]nder this statute the test of a 
jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer 
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injuiy or death for which 
damages are sought.'' Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added). If that test is met. "a 
case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other 
probabilities." Id. at 507. The Sorrell concurrence summarized the Rogers holding as 
follows: 
The notion that proximate cause must be exclusive proximate cause 
undermined Congress's chosen scheme of comparative negligence by 
effectively reviving the old rule of contributory negligence as barring any 
relief, and we held that a FELA plaintiff may recover even when the 
defendant's action was a partial cause of injuiy but not the sole one. 
Recovery under the statute is possible, we said, even when an employer's 
contribution to injuiy was slight in relation to all other legally cognizable 
causes. 
Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799. 810-11 (Souten J., concurring). 
Rogers cannot be read to overrule the federal proximate cause standard that 
the Court had established in its prior FELA cases, including Davis. Rogers was 
not creating new law at all; it restated settled law under the FELA for cases 
involving multiple causes of the injuiy. See Mines v Sweeney. 201 P. 165. 170 
(W\o. 1921) ("Under this act the railroad company is liable, if its negligence 
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contributes proximately to the injury, no matter how slightly, and no matter how 
great may be the negligence of the employee.5"). 
Indeed, as the Sorrell concurrence noted. ''[t]he absence of any intent to 
water down the common law requirement of proximate cause is evident form the 
prior cases on which Rogers relied/" Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 811 (Souter, J., 
concurring). Far from overruling its FELA proximate cause precedents, the 
Rogers Court derived its test of a jury case from those authorities. For example, 
Rogers cited Cor ay, which, as noted above, held that the railroad's negligence 
must be either 'the sole or a contributory proximate cause" of the employee's 
injury. See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506, n. 11 (citing Coray, 335 U.S. at 523). 
Similarly, Rogers cited Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., which held 
that the railroad can only be held liable if "the jury detemiines that the defendant's 
breach is 'a contributory proximate cause' of injury." See Rogers, 352 U.S. at 507 
n. 13. See also Rogers, 352 U.S. at 508-09 n. 16 (relying on Tiller v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54. 67 (1943) (holding that the issue under the FELA 
is ''whether the carrier was negligent and whether that negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injury"). Finally, it is notable that the Rogers Court, in 
stating the test for a jury case, did not quarrel with the proximate cause instructions 
given to the jury. Sorrell 111 S. Ct. 799. 811. 
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3. Supreme Court Cases After Rogers v. Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Company Confirm That Proximate Cause 
Remains an Element in FELA Actions. 
Later Supreme Court cases show that Rogers did not abrogate the longstanding 
rule of proximate cause. In Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., the jury had been 
instructed that it must find proximate cause, and render a special verdict that "the injuries 
to the plaintiff [were] proximately caused by the acts or omissions of the defendant." 372 
U.S. 108, 111 (1963) (ellipses omitted) (railroad employee suffered injuries after 
allegedly receiving an insect bite along railroad right of way). The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law to the defendant, 
applying the test for review of the sufficiency of the evidence of proximate causation 
provided in Tennant, which leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicting inferences of 
causation. Id.dX 114-15. Importantly, the Court characterized Rogers as one of the 
;%[l]ater Federal Employers' Liability Act cases involving sufficiency of the evidence on 
causation where several explanations are plausible [that] follow the teaching of the 
Teimcmt case" (i.e , that plausible inferences of proximate cause are for the jury). Id. at 
115-16. In Gallick, there were several competing possible causes of the insect 
infestation, unrelated to the railroad, which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 112 
(possible causes included pollution of the Cuyahogo River by others and ''unsanitary 
places situated on property not owned or controlled by the railroad'*). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court, one year after, reaffirmed and applied the rule that 
an employer could be liable for a violation of a statutory duty that is 'the proximate cause 
of the accident*' in a case under the Jones Act (which incorporates FELA). Kernan v Am. 
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 4265 434 (1958) (quoting Davw, 263 U.S. at 243) (examining 
whether a Jones Act plaintiff, like a FELA plaintiff, can recover for injuries caused by his 
or her employer's violation of a safety statute). The Court reviewed not only Davis, 
which clearly was not overruled by Rogers, but also five other proximate cause 
precedents under the FELA, and held that 'the principles governing those cases clearly 
should apply here.'" ¥L.ernan, 355 U.S. at 439. There can be no reasonable doubt that 
proximate cause is the rule under the FELA. 
4. The Cases Cited By Mr. Raab Support The District Court's 
Ruling Which Followed United States Supreme Court Precedent. 
Mr Raab relies upon, and cites, Rogers which has been discussed above and 
shown to support the district court's ruling. Rogers did not criticize and reject the aspect 
of "proximate cause" that requires a plaintiff to show a legal connection between the 
defendant's conduct at issue and the plaintiffs injury. The other cases cited by Mr. Raab 
cannot alter the rule of law on causation espoused by the United States Supreme Court, 
nor do they purport to do so. 
In Christiansen v Union Pacific Railroad Co , 2006 UT App 180. 136 P 3d 1266, 
which relied on Rogers, the Utah Court of Appeals did not ha\e before it the issue of 
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causation. On appeal was the denial of summary judgment for the railroad which the 
railroad sought on the basis of the plaintiff having insufficient evidence to prove 
negligence. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the plaintiff had to prove the 
railroad's negligence, i.e., a breach of the duty to use reasonable care in furnishing a safe 
place to work under the circumstances. 2006 UT App 180, «fl 9, 136 P.3d at 1270. The 
Court of Appeals also made reference to the fact that in FELA cases the plaintiff is 
entitled to trial by jury. 2006 UT App. 1805 \ 105 136 P.3d at 1270. The Court of 
Appeals upheld the denial of summary judgment because it uconclude[d] that [the 
plaintiff] has provided sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer that. . . the 
[railroad] failed to prove a safe workplace" which of course meant a "reasonably" safe 
workplace in light of the legal standard for negligence previously stated by the court. 
2006 UT App 180,1111, 136P.3dat 1271. By acknowledging that evidence sufficient to 
prove just 1% negligence is lighter than requiring evidence to prove 51% or more 
negligence, this case does not purport to do away with "proximate cause*5 and impose a 
lighter standard for proving legal causation in FELA cases. 
In fact, Christiansen supports the district court's ruling. As Mr. Raab points out, 
where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ on the issue of whether employer fault 
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played any part in the employee's injury, there is no jury case. Petition, at 8.4 Likewise, 
there is no jury case where the evidence cannot lead to any honest difference on the issue 
of whether any percentage of employer negligence proximately caused the employee's 
injury. Even in FELA cases, the issue of causation should not be required to go to trial 
where as a matter of law a reasonable jury cannot find proximate cause by a 
preponderance of the evidence. This principle was properly applied by the district court 
when it rejected Mr. Raab's theory that the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006 
caused his injury when he later bumped his head on the bottom of an air conditioner in a 
6000 series locomotive. 
Plaintiff also cites Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287 
(1925). The issue was not over the sufficiency of the evidence to prove legal causation, 
as Mi". Raab erroneously states in his Petition. The issue before the Court was whether a 
safety act was applicable. The act at issue provided that cars moved in interstate traffic 
were to be equipped with working couplers that did not require men to go between cars to 
uncouple the cars. The facts were that a car was being pulled by a chain that required the 
4Mr. Raab cites Harbin v. Burlington N.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129 (7th Cir, 1990), as 
support. In Harbin, the Circuit Court found that evidence of locomotives emitting clouds 
of exhaust fumes in an area with no ventilation and where the plaintiff was required to 
work, coupled with the plaintiff working around excessive soot and debris with 
inadequate face masks, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the railroad's failure to 
take available corrective measures and precautions could be some negligence. Id. at 131-
32. Causation was not at issue. 
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plaintiff to go between the cars to disengage the chain, and the plaintiff was injured while 
performing that service. The Court held that the safety act applied. Id. at 291-92. The 
plaintiff "went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car which it was 
necessary to detach did not meet the statutory requirements especially intended to protect 
men in his position/* Id. at 292. This case supports the district court's ruling in the case 
at bar, since any statute that prevents defective dynamic brakes on locomotives is not 
intended to prevent employees from entering other stationary locomotives that do not 
have defective brakes and that are detached from the locomotive with the defective 
brakes. If anything, the alleged defective brake merely resulted in Mr. Raab doing 
additional physical work than he otherwise may have had to do, during which work he 
bumped his head on an air conditioner. 
Finally, Mr. Raab cites Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 56 F.3d 1226 (10th 
Cir. 1995). This is one of the cases that appears to have erroneously construed Rogers to 
take the element of proximate causation out of the FELA. The Wilson court incorrectly 
assumed that causation exists if negligence played any part in injuring the plaintiff, rather 
than liability exists if negligence proximately caused my part of the plaintiffs injuiy. Id. 
at 1230. Consequently, the court failed to analyze the facts under the lens of the proper 
proximate cause standard, and held that it was enough that he was injured while returning 
from attending to a safety statute violation. Id. 
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In the alternative, the Wilson court reasoned that even under the proximate cause 
standard, causation could be proven if it was foreseeable that an employee charged with 
"repairing"' a safety statute violation must go to and return from the repair site in the dark 
on uneven ground where he could step in a rut. Id. Although that too is an unreasonable 
stretch of the concept of "'proximate cause'" as being that cause which naturally and 
efficiently arose from the condition in need of repair, as opposed to the rut in uneven 
ground that could not be seen, it still fails to meet the facts of the case at bar. Mr. Raab 
never attempted to repair the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006. He only set 
out - or detached - the 5006 unit from the rest of the train. He did not bump his head 
while doing that work, or while going to or from the 5006 unit. Only after it had been set 
out and a new consist of locomotives were in place, did Mi*. Raab bump his head while 
performing duties necessary for the train to be able to proceed to its destination. Mi*. 
Raab bumped his head while in a 6000 series locomotive cab he did not have to be in to 
repair or set out the 5006 unit and he could have been in for any number of reasons at any 
time. It was not reasonably foreseeable that any defective dynamic brake on unit 5006 
could lead to Mr. Raab bumping his head in a different locomotive that was at the time 
not moving. 
The facts are not disputed. The only issue is whether the law allows a jury to find 
a legal causal connection between the alleged defective dynamic brake on unit 5006 and 
Mr. Raab's injury from having bumped his head in a 6000 series locomotive. There is 
nothing for a jury to decide, since under the law discussed above, including all authority 
cited by Mr. Raab, there is no legal causation as a matter of law. 
II. The Interlocutory Appeal Mr. Raab Seeks Is Unnecessary And Will Cause 
Undue Delay. 
Finally, an immediate appeal will not advance the efficient termination of this 
litigation, but instead will needlessly delay it First, as just discussed, any appeal would 
be a waste of time because Mr. Raab errs in his legal position. Yet even if Mr. Raab 
could be correct, which he cannot under the law, it would not require a retrial of any 
claim. 
The district court's dismissal of Mr. Raab's allegation of a defective dynamic 
brake on unit 5006 is not a complete dismissal. Mr. Raab still has a negligence action 
regarding the existence of the air conditioner on the 6000 series locomotive. He could 
prevail on that claim and on his belief he was not contributorily negligent, rendering the 
safety statute violation claim meaningless. Even if he were found at trial to be 
contributorily negligent, his full damages still would have been determined before any 
reduction for his proportionate share of negligence, and any reduction in recovery for his 
contributoiy negligence could be reversed in a subsequent trial of the claimed violation of 
a safety statute. If he did not prevail on his negligence claim, he could proceed to trial 
after an appeal on his safety statute violation claim without the negligence claim 
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previously tried. There does not have to be any duplication. Thus, an appeal now is not 
necessary and will needlessly delay this case. 
Alternatively, Mr. Raab contends that even if he fully prevails on Ms negligence 
claim without any contributory negligence assessed against him, he may be prejudiced by 
having the jury award a lesser amount of damages in a negligence case than it otherwise 
would award in a combined negligence and safety statute violation case. Remember that 
the statutoiy violation only results in negligence per se; additional or more severe 
damages do not exist just because the conduct which caused the damages is deemed by 
law to be a statutoiy violation rather than simple negligence. This argument by Mr. Raab 
is nothing more than his hope that he can improperly inflame the jury's passions and 
prejudices by presenting a statutoiy violation case instead of mere negligence. He does 
not want the jury to consider his own negligence. He wants an appeal now so that he can 
proceed to trial on the safety statute violation claim without the negligence claim he will 
drop before trial. It is not reasonable to expect a jury to base its decision on the amount 
of damages on facts that have nothing to do with the actual amount of damages suffered, 
but instead on the basis for liability. There is no justifiable reason that compels allowing 
an appeal now just to consider whether plaintiff can try the statutoiy violation claim 
together with his simple negligence claim or alone. This case should proceed to trial on 
his simple negligence claim, and all appealable issues can be considered by this Court 
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thereafter as contemplated by the rules of procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no reason for an appeal at all, and certainly no reason for an immediate 
appeal at this time. The district court's ruling is consistent with controlling authority, and 
even this court's prior decision in Christiansen. An interlocutory appeal only will delay 
the trial on the negligence claim that will still need to be tried regardless of any decision 
on appeal. Also, a trial of the negligence claim could lead to other issues that would 
require another appeal. An appeal now is not only unnecessary but it could result in piece 
meal appeals and resulting delay. Therefore, Mr. Raab's Petition should be denied, and 
URC respectfully requests that it be denied. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2008. 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
D \ J (j 
By ( omx\ 
Casey K. IV^Garvey | 
Attorneys for Defendant, Utah Railway Company 
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I hereby certify that on this 6th day of March, 2008,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER REGARDING LIABILITY 
BASED ON ALLEGATION OF A DEFECTIVE DYNAMIC BRAKE ON 
LOCOMOTIVE UNIT 5006 to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen C. Thompson 
KIRKLIN FOLAWN, LLP 
522 SW 5th Avenue, Ste 1100 
Portland Oregon 97204 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
{p^kJ^^Jp-i^L^ 
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deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT RAAB, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 050 908 773 
Judge. LA. DEVER 
This matter before the Court on defendant's motion for partial summary 
judgment. The plaintiff was represented by Stephen Thompson and the defendant was 
represented Scott Savage and Casey McGarvey. The motion contained two aspects: 
1. Was there liability based upon the alleged failure of the dynamic brake on 
locomotive UR 5006 
2 Was there a violation of the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act. 
At the hearing on December 11, 2007, the Court ruled that the alleged failure of 
the dynamic brake was not relevant to the issue of the defendant's potential liability to 
the plaintiff for injuries incurred while in the cab of a different locomotive. The Court 
took under advisement the second aspect. 
After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, the Court notes the 
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following: 
1. The Federal Locomotive Inspection Act (FLIA) requires that locomotives and 
their parts and appurtenances be "in proper condition and safe to operate without 
unnecessary danger of personal injury." 49 U.S.C. §20701. 
2. 49 CFR § 229.45 states that "[a]ll systems and components on a locomotive 
shall be free of conditions that endanger the safety of the crew . . .,! 
3. There is no evidence that the FLIA or any regulation specifically mentions air 
conditioners or minimum cab ceiling clearances. 
4. There is no evidence that the air conditioner in the subject locomotive was 
malfunctioning, defective or broken as the time the plaintiff bumped into it. 
5. As pointed out in the defendant's memorandum the plaintiff does not have to 
show the existence of a defects to find a violation of the Act but he does need to show 
that his injury was a proximate result of the failure of the part in question (AC Unit) to 
perform properly. In this particular case, the plaintiff alleges that the AC Unit was hung 
too low, reducing the head clearance. There is no allegation that there was a defect in 
the functioning of the unit. 
6. The cases cited by the plaintiff: Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.Co. and Delevie v. 
Reading Co. can be distinguished from this case. Lilly involved a fall from the top of an 
ice covered tender and Delevie involved a gearbox that impeded the plaintiff's access to 
2 
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a safety handrail. The Utah case of Ehalt v. McCarthy, 138 P.2d 646 (Utah 1943)!which 
like the cases cited by the plaintiff addressed the Boiler Inspection Act (the predecessor 
of FLIA), appears more on point. In Ehalt the Utah Supreme Court, in distinguishing the 
case from Lilly, pointed out that 
A danger created by the non-attention or neglect incident 
to operation which does not produce an engine defective 
in itself constitutes the basis for an action, not under the 
Boiler Inspection Act, but under other Sections of Title 45. 
At. 646. 
7. The undisputed facts in this case establish that this is a case of non-attention 
incident to operation and therefore appropriate for summary judgment denying liability 
under FLIA. 
8. The evidence of the removal of the air conditioning units is inadmissable to 
show negligence or prove liability under Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
However, this prohibition is subject to being set aside if the facts of the case establish 
that the use is for impeachment. 
Counsel for the defendant to draft the appropriate Order. 
Dated this 11 th day of February, 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry was 
mailed this _jj day of February, 2008, to the following: 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Susan E. Baird 
BERMAN & SAVAGE 
170 South Main St, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Stephen C. Thompson 
KIRKLIN FOLAWN, LLP 
522 SW 5th Ave, Ste 1100 
Portland, OR 97204 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Ste 609 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Deputy'Court Cler 
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